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In the

SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
J. HARO·LD 1IITCHELL,
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FREIGHT LINES,
LTD., a corporation, and MARVIN C.
Y'"AN PATTEN,

Case No.
7242
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RESPONDENT'S. BRIE:B""'

STATE~IENT

OF CASE

All page referenc-es used are those of the record.
The parti~es are referred to as in the court below. All
italics are ours unless otherwise indicated.
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sonal injuries and da1nage to property sustained by him
in a collision with the defendant corporation's truck,
'vhich oc.curred on April3, 1947 at about 2,:15 p.m. Plaintiff was driving his 1946 Chevrolet pickup truck in a
northerly direction on U. S. Highway 91 and upon r·eaching a point about 15 miles north of Paragonah, Utah, a
dust storm enveloped the highway which rendered visibility poor while plaintiff Wa's attempting to pull off on
his side of thH highway, because of the density of the dust
storm, a large freight truck and trailer o'vned by the defendant corporation and being operated by the defendant
Marvin C. Van Patten collided head-on with plaintiff's
truck inflicting serious personal injuries on the plaintiff
and demolishing his truck beyond repair. The defendants' truck was attempting to pass another vehicle, which
was towing a boat trailer and was proceeding in the same
direction as defendants' truck when the collision occurred on or near the shoulder on plaintiff's side of the
highway. Plaintiff recovered a total verdict in the Distric.t Court of Salt Lake County, in the sum of $21,594.. 22.
T)efendants' n1otion for ne'v trial was presented to the
trial judge, the Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr., and on
,June 26, 1948, 'vas by the c.ourt denied.
In his complaint plaintiff alleged that the defendants in the operation of their truck were negligent in
the following partic.ulars :
A. That U. S. Highway 91 at the point of collision
was a two-lane public highway with 19·Y2 feet of paveInent and four f~eet of gravel shoulders on each side~ that
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said traffic lane~ "·ere \Yell marked and separated by a
\Yell-defined yellow· linP, and that the defendants negligently, carele~sly and recklessly drove their truck across
the center line of said highway and across the traffic
lane provided for northbound vehicles and onto the
graveled shoulder on the extreme ~east side of the high"·ay into collision 'vith plaintiff's truck.
B. That the defendants negligently, carelessly and
heedlessly failed to n1aintain a proper lookout for plaintiff and for other vehicular traffic proceeding along said
highway, in that defendants either failed to observe the
presence of plaintiff~s truck on the extreme east shoulder
of said high"\\.,.ay, or, having observed the same, failed
to p·ay any heed or take any reasonable measures to
avoid colliding with plaintiff's truck.
C. That for sometime prior to, and at the time of
the collision, a dust storm covered the highway and impaired visibility, and that under such circumstances it
became and was the duty of the defendants to stop· their
truck or 'to operate it at such a speed as would enable
them to avoid colliding with other vehicular traffic upon
the highway, including plaintiff's truck; but, nothwithstanding said duty the defendants drove their heavy
truck and trailer along said highway in the dust storm
at an unreasonable and ·excessive rate of speed, under
the circumstances, to-wit : at a sp·eed in excess of 15
1niles p·er hour.
Plaintiff further alleged that as a direct and proxiInate result of the negligent acts and omissions of the
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

defendants he suffered severe, permanent, and disabling
injuries which caused him excruciating pain and impaired his ability to ·perform work and earn his livelihood. The specific injuries alleged and proved will be
hereafter shown in the statement of facts.
Plaintiff also claim·ed property damage to his truck
and personal effe-cts in the amount of $1344.00.
In the Answer, the defendants admitted that defendant, Van Patten was the servant, agent and employee
of the defendant corp·oration and that there was a collision bet\veen the plaintiff's vehicle and the defendants'
truck which occurred on the shoulder east of the highway, about 15 miles north of Paragonah, Utah, but they
deny that the collision was proximately caus~ed by any
carelessness, or negligence on their part. Defendants
also denied the allegations of the complaint with respect
to plaintiff's injuries and special damage.
As affirmative defenses the defendants alleged that
\Yhile the defendants were on the left side of the high\vay-, passing a pass~enger car and trailer proceeding in
the same direction, plaintiff approached from the opposite direction on the wrong side· of the highway and suddently and unexpectedly cut across the center line of the
highway immediat~ely in front of defendants' truck, creating an emergency; and that the ensuing collision was
solely caused or proximately contributed to by plaintiff's
negligence in approaching defendants on the wrong side
of the highway and unexp~ect~edly creating an emergency
by turning across the highway immediately in front of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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defendant~,

in failing to keep a proper look-out, in failing to keep his truck under proper and safe control, in
failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid collision, and
in driving his truck \vhile it was overloaded with four
people in the front seat, ":hich interefered with his control of the truck.
Plaintiff filed a reply den~ring the affirmative allegations of defendants' answer.
Defendants complain of th,e size of the verdict and
eontend that certain erroneous instructions were given
by the court and that certain rulings of the court with
reBpect to the adlnission in evidence of the annuity
tables (Exhibit X) were erro:qeous; but defendants altogether fail to point out wherein the claimed erroneous
instructions or rulings resulted in a miscarriage of
justice. It has been long established in this jurisdiction
that the jur~~ 's verdict will not be r~eversed in the absence
of a sho\ving of prejudicial error, resulting in a miscarriage of justice (Sec. 104-39-3, Utah Code Ann~tated
1943). The instructions given by the court were correct,
except in those instanees where the court gave instructions more favorable to the defendant than justified hy
la,v. Indeed, the court overemphasized defendants'
theories of def.ense upon which, there was no substantial
evidence.

THE FACTS
\\T e regard defendants' staten1ent of facts incomplete

and disagree with their interpretation of the

~evidence.
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We, therefore, deen1 it expedient to pres·ent to this court
a n1ore co1n plete review o.f the evedence.
The evidence is clear, convincing, -an·d uncontradicted
that the collision occured on plaintiff's side of the high\va.y, near the east edge of the paved portion. Defendants in their brief refer to a conflict in the eviden0e with
respect tthe point of impact, which was described as 10
or 15 feet east of the paved portion (R. 429) and again
as 15 feet ·east of the center line (R. 454-5). Both references were to testimony of the defendant Van Patten.
The evidence is also clear, convincing, and uncontradicted
that the def.endant was attempting to pass another
vehie'Le at 'the time the co'llision occurred, notwithstanding
the poor visibility caused by a dust s:torm which enveloped the high,vay. The defendant, howe·ver, sought to
excuse his presence on the ·extreme wrong side of the
highway by saying that as he was passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, he saw 'P'laintiff
approaching on the highway on the wrong side of the
road, and that plaintiff's vehicle cut over creating an
emergency which required hiln to turn off the wrong side
to avoid collision. That defendant had considerable difficulty in respect to this amazing contention is indicated
by his testimony.
Defendant described his vehicle as being about 60 feet
long ( R. 423). He testified that as he came ove.r the
ridge, he could see a dust storm on the flats and as he
proceeded onto the flats, he came onto a ear pulling
an open two-wheel boat trailer; that he followed the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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trailer for :2 or B nliles and that it 'vas pretty 'vindy and
dusty ( R.. 424) ; that during one of the breaks in the
~tor1u he started to pass the vehicle in front of hin1 and
as he got about half 'vay alongside the trailer, he noticed
a car coining up from th:e op·posite side. It seemed that
plaintiff crossed the center line just as the defendant saw
hi1n and he couldn't get back behind the car he was atten1pting to pass, so he pulled con1pletely off the road
·w·here the collision occurred; that the car he was attempting to pas~, 'vas going het,,reen 10 and 15 miles p1er hour
(R. 425): that as he attempted to pass the other car he
could Bee possibly 200 yards ahead and there we-re no
cars coining from the opposite direction on the east side
of the highway and there 'vere no cars coming from the
opposite direction on the west half of the highway (R.
426) ; that it see1ned like plaintiff's truck came from the
center of the road or opposite side, like he crossed over
(R.. 426); that the plaintiff's truck was possibly 100
yards -n1aybe not that far, 'vhen he first saw him. Defendant believes that he got the whole truck and trailer
off the road before the collision; that he turned off the
highway when he saw the other car at about 45 degre·e
angle (R. 427); that as he atten1pted to pass the other
car, Van Patten shifted into third direct and was going
possibly bet,veen 15 and 20 miles p·er hour (R. 429);
that the point of impact was approxima'tely 10 or 15 feet
off the highway and he didn't travel much over 5 or 10
feet after the impact (R. 429) ; that the right front corner of defendants' truck collided with the left front
corner of p1anti:ff 's (R. 430-1-2).
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On cross-examination, the defendant, Van Patten,
stated that he had no idea ho'v fast -plantiff's truck vvas
going when he hit it (R. 438) yet he· knows he_ was moving
more than 5 miles per hour (R 439). 'Then he flies in
the face of physics, and states that the small truck continued on in the direction it was n1oving after the impact,
even though the right front corner of the heavy truck
struck the left corner of the light truck, (R. 439). Van
Patten knew there was a heavy dust storm enveloping
the highway and he enter;ed it behind the car and trailer.
He didn't like the idea of being behind anything. (R. 441)
At the time the dust broke and he deeided to pass, he
could_see about 200 ya.rds ahead of him, but in his sworn
deposition before tria], he ·stated he could see just 100
yards ahead (R. 442). Since the deposition, he has had
time to compute the distance and he computes the distance at 200 yards. The break in the storn1 continued so
he could continue to see 200 yards, ahead. (R. 443) He
started to go about 20 miles p·er hour, or perhaps fa'Ster
so he could pass the car and trailer and he realized at
the time, that his equipment was 60 feet long and that
he would have to have time to pass the other car and get
back on his side of the road ( R. 444). He looked down
both sides of the highway and saw the plaintiff's car
just straddle the center line. (R. 446) He was watching the highway, both sides all the time. He was passing
the other vehicle and he could see 200 yards down the
high,vay, but he couldn't see plaintiff until he got within
100 yards, at which time plaintiff was astraddle the
center line. \/an Patten had no idea how fast plaintiff
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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\Vas g·omg-. He didn't have thne to either pass in front
and get on his side or to stop and get behind, although
he realized that 'vhen he passes traffic on a hig'hway in
a dust stor1n, that is '\vhat he has to have tim~e to do. He
kne''" fron1 his experience in traveling Highway 91, that
it was a pretty busy highway 'vith ears going in both
directions all the time, and he had in mind at the tin1e
he started to pass, that out of the dust storn1 a car might
come in another direction and he also realized how much
distance he \Vould have to travel before he could safely
pass the car he "-as passing (R. 447-448). He does not
belieYe that he told the sheriff that when he first saw
the other ear it 'vas 100 yards away, but if Sheriff Smith
took the stand and testified that Van Patten told him
the car "~as only 20 or 25 feet away, he could not say
w··hether that 'vould be true or not. He may have told the
8heriff that. (R. 451). We desire to quote the following
testi1nony directly from the record, commencing near the
bottom of page 451:

"Q. You didn't think Mr.
blame, did you~

~!itchell

A.

No, sir.

Q.

1.,.. ou don't think that now, do

A.

No, sir.

was to

you~

Q. In driving in the manner you have described, you don't think you were to blame~
. A..

No, sir.

Q. You think you drove your truck on that
occasion in a safe p·rudent way~
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A.

Yes.

Q.

Despite the length and size of your truckT

A.

Yes.

Despite the visibility being restricted to
the point it was~
Q.

A.

Yes.

Q.

You were driving your truck in a safe

way~

A.

Yes.

Would you drive it the same way now if
you had an opportunity~
Q.

A.

Yes.

Q. Under the same circumstances~
A.

Yes.'' (R. 452).

"\Tan Patten stated that the point of in1pact was 15
feet east of the center line and that he proceeded off the
highway on 'about a 45 degree angle prior to the imp~act
(R. 455). He stated that his truck and trailer were 60
feet long and assuming that the rear wheels of the trailer
had l~eft the paved portion of the highway, he had to go
at least ·60 feet on a 45 degree angle before the point of
i1npact, yet that the eenter line of the high,vay was just
15 feet from the point of impact. H.e admitted that that
didn't add up and that the highway was about 19lj2 feet
all the way across the paved portion; that he must have
been mistaken about the angle he was traveling, and that
he must also have been mistaken as to whether or not
his entire trailer had left the highway prior to the impact
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(R. 436) That at the tiine he vvas about to pass the said
ear, he \Ya~ pretty well over in the east lane of traffic
oYer 011 the east side of said high,vay, and that he didn't
have to go very far before he got off the highway. He
said that h-e sa 'v the ear 100 yards ahead coining in his
direction fro1n the center of the road and that he, Van
Patten, 'vas going approximately 20 miles an hour. He
testified that being already practically off the pavement,
he arrived at the point of imp1act at the same time the
plaintiff's car did coming from the center and that the
plaintiff's car was 100 yards a'vay from him. He stated
that he n1ay have told Sheriff Smith, when he first saw
the other car that it was 20 or 25 feet away (R. 457).
Counsel for the defendant ma·de ~a desperate attempt
to rescue the witness Van Patten, from his dilemma, with
respBct to the distances involved in his testimony. We
,fesire to quote from the record beginning a:t page 458 :
'' Q. And when counsel has asked you certain
distances by yards and feet, have you been p~ay
ing attention as to whether he has asked you
ho'v many yards or how many feet~

A.

I believe I hav·e.

Q. When y·ou first saw this ~fitchell truck,
just to be clear on it, do you know how many
feet that truck was away from you, by number of
feet or by number of yards, either qne?

A.
m·ean'
Q.

When I first saw the Mitchell car, you
Yes.
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A.

Not accurately, no.

Q. And if you were to now state your best
approximation taking into consideration your best
estimate of that distance based on what you saw
at that time and what your deductions have been
since as to where the accident happened, how far
would you say in feet that distance was across
from you to the Mitchell truck, when you first
saw it~

A. I couldn't say exactly in feet. It would
only be an estimate on it at all. I am not a judge
of distances.
Q.

Well, approximately in

fe~et,

if you can

state~

A. Approximately 100 or 200 feet maybe.
(R. 458).
Now, counsel asked you, when you saw
that truck, if it wasn't 100 yards down the highway'
Q.

A.

No.

Did you so understand him when he
asked you that question~·
Q.

A.

I believe that is the way it was, in yards.

Q.

In yardst

A.

No, I don't believe it was in yards.

Q.

You don't believe it would be 100

A.

No.

yards~

Q. If you answer~ed counsel's question to
that effect, you mistook yards for feet, did you
not~
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~\.

\~ es,

sir.

Q. Ko\Y~ \vhen you pulled out around this
trailer you say you could see down the highway
for approximately 200 yards o?
. A..

Yes, sir.

Q.

You had your eyes down that highway,

did you
~~.

not·~

Yes, sir.

Q. Were there any cars coming towards
you on the east side of the highway7

A.

No, sir.

Q. Did you see any coming towards you on
the \vest side of the highway~

A.

No, sir.

Q. Did you expect there would be any cars
coming towards you on the east side of the highway~

A.

N" o, sir." (R. 459).

On further re-cross-examination \Vith respect to his
chang·e in testhnony relative to distances from yards to
feet, the 'vitness testified (R. 461-4) as follows:
'' Q. Now, you say you wer,e mistaken in
ans,vering my question \Vhen you were testifying
about yards and now you want to correct that to
feet; is that right~

A. Yes.
Q. S.o that now the Mitchell truck, identified
by position No. 4, was now just 100 feet away
when you first saw it~
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A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And it was straddle the center line!

A.

Yes, sir.

Q. And as you were attempting to pass this
other car you were watching the whole road ahead,
weren't you~

A.

Y~es,

Q.

And you could see 200 yards, could you

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Or did you mean

A.

I meant yards on that.

Q.

You could see 200

A.

Yes, sir.

sir.

not'
feet~

yards~

Q. And yet you didn't see the Mitchell car
until it came within 100 feet~
A. 'That is right.
Q.

Why, on account of the

dust~

A.
road.

Well, it was on the opposite side of the

Q.

I thought you said it was in the center

of the

road~

A. Yes, I wasn ''t loking for one there. I
was looking more or less down the east side.
Q.

'Veren't you looking in the center of the

road~

A.

~es,

Q.

Weren't you looking in the other spaees

sir.
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...~.

I \Vasn 't looking for any on that side.

Did you think it was safe to pass thi~
car, if there n1ight be another car in front of it
going in the same direction()?
Q.

A. Yes, sir.
If there were a string of cars going in
th·e san1e direction you could have passed in that
dust storm?
Q.

~~-

No.

Then it was important for you to know
whether the highway on the other side was clear
or covered 'vith cars~
Q.

A.

If they were going in the same

direction~

Q. No matter \vhat direction they w·ere going
in; wasn't it~
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. If you were looking to see if there was
another car, you would have to pass the one
so you could see if there was, hy looking on :the
other side of the road, wouldn't you?

A.

Yes.

And you say you were not looking at the
other side of the road when you were passing; is
that right~
Q.

A.

No.

How do you account for the fact you
didn't see the Mitchell car until it was 100 feet
Q.

away~

A.

I can't.
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Q.

It just came out of nowher·e'

A.

Y~es,

sir.

And you were looking all the time and
would have seen it, but it just came out of noQ.

where~

A.

That is right.

Q. You testified you may have told Sheriff
Smith !that car was only 20 or 25 feet away when
you first saw it'
A.

Yes.

"When you rnay have told him, that may
have been the truth!
Q.

A.

It may have been.
;

If it may have been true that the Mitchell
car was only 20 or 25 feet away when you first
saw it, why are you testifying here today that it
was 100 feet away~
Q.

A. That is what I say, I don't remember
what I told Sheriff Smith.
Q.

You said it may have been true?

A.

I said it may have been true.

Q.

Did you tell him it was 20 feet away?

A..

I may have told him 20; I may have told

him more. I can't remember.
Q. And it may have be·en ~t:rrue fhat that is aU
the farther ·aw1ay ,it w:as; isn't th1at correct?

A.

Yes.

Otherwise you would not have told him
tha;t; isn't that correct~
Q.
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~-\..

Yes.

Q. No,v, I \Yant you to tell m~e why here
today before this jury under oath you are willing
to testify it was 100 feet away when you. first saw

"t'

1 .

~:\...

It Inay have been 100 feet.

Q. There is a vast difference between 20
and 100 feet~
. ..-\...

Yes, there is.

Q.

Or between 100 feet and 100

_._:\..

Yes, sir. ( R. 464) .

yards~

Q. How could it possibly have been 100 f~eet
and also possibly 20 feet at the same time'

A.

It couldn't.

Q. S.a yo~t don't know how far atoay it w:as,
do you; is that right?
A.

That is right.

Q. .A. nd you are not goim.g to testify here
today it was mo.r:e tharn 20 feet ~aw,a.y, are you?
A.

It could hav.e been.

Q.

You are not g~oing to

A.

I couldn't b,e acctoriate .an it, n.o. (R. 465).

s~ay

"

it was, are you?

It is significant that \Tan Patten did not observe,
\Vhether or not the Pace car, \vith the boat trailer, which
he \\Tas atten1pting to pass, did anything \Vith respect
t ~) changing its course or slackening its speed, after Van
Patten saw Mitchell's ca:r, a:s he -claims, in t~he center
of the hig]nya~T (R. 468).
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SOME OF THE SELF-CONTRADICTIONS
OF VAN PATTEN
1. That the point of impact was 10 or 15
feet off the highway. (R. 429) ; That the point
of impact was 15 feet east of the center line. (R.
454-5).
2. That his vehicle with traileT attached was
about 60 feet 'long (R. 436-7), yet he left the highway at a 45-degree angle and arrived at the point
of impact 15 feet east of the center line. (R. 455 ).
3. That all of his vehicle was off the highway at the time of impact. (R. 430; R. 454). That
all of his vehicle was not off the highway at the
time of impact. (R. 456).
4. That he could see 200 yards up the high'vay as he attempted to pass the Pace car and
he 'vas watching both sides of the highway all
the time. (R. 446). In his sworn deposition he
stated he could see just 100 yards ahead. (R.
442). That he ''Tasn't looking for a car on the
opposite side of the road. (R. 462-463). That
he was looking all the tin1e and would have seen
the Mitchell car but it just came out of nowhere.
(R. 463).
5. That the 1iitchell car was 100 yards away
straddle the center line when he first saw it. (R.
447). That the Mitchell car was 100 feet .avvay
and on the opposite side of the highway when he
first saw it. (R. 462). That the Mitchell car was
20 to 25 feet ahead of him when he first saw it.
(R.. 463-4-5). That he doesn't know how far a\\ray
it 'vas. (R. 465).
6. That he had no idea how fast Mitchell
"ras going. (R. 447). That he knows Mitchell
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\vas Inoving n1ore than :J n1iles per hour. (R. 439).

7. That ~fitchell was on the wrong side of
the road and suddenly cut across in the path
of 'Tan Patten's truck. (R. 447). That Mitchell
"~as not to blame. ( R. 451).
The defendants rlai1n that the self contradicted evidence of 'Tan Patten was corroborated by the witness
Pace. Pace testified that he \vas operating the car with
boat trailer attached behind in a southerly direction on
the high,vay, in the dust storm area; that he could see
the center line sometimes and that he was as near the
middle lane of his traffic as he could get ,R. 470-471).
(R. 471).

'' Q. And while you were so traveling were
you aware of a truck behind you~

A.

I was not.

Q. When was the first time you saw the
pick-up truck which was driven hy Mr. Mitchell,
that was involved in the accident~

A. Well, it just s~eemed to come up out of
nowhere. Visibility was bad, and it just came up
all of a sudden.
Q.

Which direction was the truck travelingt

A.

It was

trav~eling

north.

Q. In the opposite direction to which you
'vere traveling~
A.

Yes sir.
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Q. And how far ahead of your car was that
truck when you first saw it, that pick-up truckT

A. I could only give the distance approximately. It was a short distance, I would say
anywhere from twenty-five to fifty yards, approximately.
Wher~e

was that truck with respect to the
center line of the highway~
Q.

A. It was about in the center of the high\vay, probably straddle of the center of the yellow
line in the highway, when I saw it.

Q. And you were about twenty-five to fifty
yards from that truck at that time~
A.

Approximately, yes.

Q. Had you seen that pick-up truck prior
to that tim·e ~
A.

No sir.

Q. On which side of you did the pick-up
truck pass~
A. It passed on the east side, in his own
lane of traffic.

Q. And did you see the collision
that truck and the Arrovvhead truck~

betwe~en

A. I didn't actually see the collision. They
hit just back of me. I heard the crash, but I
didn't actually see them hit." (R. 472).
On cross-examination, the 'vitness described the dust
storm as very dense. He stated that there vvere breaks in
the dust storm that would ·permit one to see the pavelnent in head of the car. Then it would fill in, and you
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couldn •t st>e the pave1nent any"~here. So1netiu1es the
vi~ibility \Yould be reduced ahnost to the point irnmediately in front of the car. \Y" e quot~e directly from the
witness Pace's testin1ony, at the top· of page 476 in the
record:

· · Q.

In other 'vords, those gusts of wind
'vere bringing dust thickly across the highway
practically all the time, and there were some
breaks, but they were more or less just momentary
breaks, weren't they~
. .cl. Ther,e "\Vere breaks for a little time, and
it closed in.''

Then again comn1encing at page 477, the witness testified as follows:

"Q. Were you aware, at the tim·e the :truck
attempted to pass you~
_._~.

No sir. I never knew it was trying to
pass at all.

Q.

Were you required to alter the course of
your automobil·e by the approach of Mr. Mitchell's
car~

A.

No sir.

Q. You were able to continue straight on
the way you were going~

A.

Yes sir.

Q.

Undisturbed~

A.

Yes- sir.

Q.

So, if he may have momentarily traveled
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on the center line ·it wasn't suffici~ently far to
interfer;e with the movement of your car in the
opposite direction~

A.

No sir.

Q. Now, it is possible that he may not have
been straddle of the eenter line, is it not, Mr.
Pace~ ...
A. As near as I could tell, he was straddle
of the center line.

Q. Could you s~ay about how· much of his
vehicle w1as on the W'est side ·Of the center lime1
A.

No sir.

Q. Would you say he w~as st'naddle, his vehiC'le w'as as much ~as a -"o,ot to the west of the
center litne1
A.

I wouldA'tft';t

.at.t~e:mpt

t1o

s~ay.

Q. As a matter of f'aet, he may have been
right nerar the center lifne:?
A. As near as I could t·ell, he w'as riditng
very near the center line.
Q. Did you observe what distance he was
trav·eling in that position?·

A. No sir, when I seen the truck, this pickup, it just come up out of nowheres. He just
n1ade a slight turn into his line of traffic, anq
passed me in the -clear.

Q. About how far ahead of you was the
pick-up when you first observed it~
A. I stated, as near as my judgment, it was
a short distance. I would say between twenty-five
and fifty yards. A short distance." (R. 478).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23

The \Yitness testified that ther;e wa;s no curve in .the
road, that the high,vay \Yas a stra.ight-of-\vay, and that
plaintiff"s truck can1~e suddenly ou.t of the dust storm at
a distance of about twenty-five to fifty yards (R. 479).
The \Yitness Pace could not say how Inuch of plaintiff'~ vehicle \\?as ·w·est of the center line, nor would he
atten1pt to say that it was even as 1nuch as a foot to the
\Yest of the center line. The \Yitness finally admitted t'ha1t
as near as he could tell plaintiff was riding very near
the center line. This certainly does not constitute substantial evidence that plaintiff \Vas on the wrong side of
the road, if the witness would not say that he overlapped
it so 1nuch as a foot. _A_t most it constituted evidence that
plaintiff \Yas very near the center line. What witness
Pace, peering thru the dust storm interpreted a.s a
""slight" swerving to the right of plaintiff's car, very
likely was the act of the plain tiff as he started to pull
off the highway and stop.
On the other end of the dust storm, was the plaintiff,
~\Iitchell, 'vho also entered the dust storm behind another
car. He follo,ved that car for son1e distance but rather
than atte1npting to pass as the defendants had done, the
ear ahead of him, the plain tiff deen1ed it advisable to
drop behind and pull over to the side of the road an~
~top for a couple of minutes to pern1it the car ahead to
lllOYe on out of the way. Plaintiff testified that things
then see1ued to clear slightly and he proceeded back onto
the high,vay in lo\v gear at a ve:.;y lo'v rate of speed,not 1nueh oYer five n1iles per hour. -'Fisibilit~: "\vas Yery
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limited-fro1n 25 to 40 feet. Plaintiff was very particular
that he knew "\vhere he was located on the highway (R.
236). A little \Vays down the highway, that would be
south, plaintiff 1net a car with its lights on, and in that
dust there was quite a glo\v and it disturbed him a little.
He said: ''I am going to pull off the highway and stop
until this thing clears up a little." Immediately after
he passed that car, he began to do just that thing, sort of
pulling to the right vv-ith the idea of stopping, and getting
off the highway (R. 237). 1\Iitchell testified that very
definitely that he was off the paved portion when he was
struck by the defendant's truck, and that at that time he
vvas stopping, his intentions wer;e to stop, and he was
either stopped, or moving very slightly, very slowly.
That the defendant's truck could not have been over 25
feet when he first saw it. That the limit of visibility
was about 25 feet. (R. 238) When asked what steps he
took to avoid colliding with the truck when it first came
into view, Mitchell testified that there was not much he
could do being practically stopped but that he naturally
pulled hard to his right. ( R.. 239) .
It is quite clear from the testimony that the car
w·hich 1\fitchell sa"\v coming toward him ahead of the defendant's truck, was undoubtedly the Pace car, for it
had passed immediately prior to the collision. Pace
testified 'that he saw the plaintiffs truck swerve slightly
into plaintiff's lane of traffic, and that plaintiff passed
hL."'1l in the rear. (R. 478) Pace did not see the collision
but heard the ·c.rash. They hit just hack of him. (R. 472)
1~,rom all the testimony, Pace was ahead of 'lan Patten
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and yet he \vas not endangered by the approach of
J.Iitchell's e.ar, assuming against· the evidence that it ma.y
ha.Ye been 1non1entarily astraddle the center line. Pace
in advance of the \'"an Patten car, was not required to
alter the course of his vehicle to avoid colliding with
J.Iitchell and proceeded along undisturbed, from which
the jury \Yere com·p~elled to conclude, that if Van Patten
had been in his proper lane of traffic, he would not have
been confronted with any emergency. Van Patten cannot reasonably seek to be relieved of the consequences of
an em~rgency situation which was created entirely
through his '0\vn folly. Th·ere -could he no possible causal
connection between any negligent act of Mitchell's and
the collision vYhich resulted from the presence of the
.A._rrowhead truck on Mitchell's side of the road.
:J.[itchell continued to the right of the center line,
\Veil over the shoulder of the road on his right, right up
to the time he started pulling off the highway, just prior
to the accident. The left wheels were still on the asphalt
and his right wheels were on the shoulder. (R. 337 -338)
There was one car with lights on going south, that he met
a short distance ahead of the truck. The meeting of that
car made him determine to pull off the road. and wait
for the dust to clear. Then just ahead of the truck \Vas
another car traveling in the same direction as the truck.
(R. 338-339) The truck was very close to the other car.
The other car was coming past him when the truck appeared back of it on plaintiff's side of the road, when he
first sa\v the truck. (R. 340) Plaintiff denied that he was
straddle the center line when the car passed immediately
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in front of the truck, but it is certain that he was well
east of the center line.
Joan Mitchell testified that she was plaintiff's daughter, age 16, and was a passenger in the truck her father
was driving. That as they entered the dust storm, they
were follo'\\-ing another car, and her father stopped for
a coup1e of minutes to let the car go ahead. And then
started forward in low gear, from which gear, he did
not shift at all. She was watching the center line most
of the time. (R. 360-361) The dust storm was awfully
thick and you couldn't see much more than about 20 or
25 feet ahead. Plaintiff did not at any time drive his
truck on the left side of the center line. They were just
pulling off the highway on their side, when the truck
came into view (R. 362). They had practically stopped
and were going about 3 or 4 miles per hour, when the
Arrowhead truck came into view. (R. 363)
\Vith respect to her position in the seat, Joan testified th!at her father did not hit her in driving t!he truck.
(R. 367) She recalled that the car passed just in front
of the Arrowhead truck (R. 3·68).
Sheriff Kent G. Smith testified that he investigated
the accident. (R. 384) He stated that Exhibits T, and U,
and V, represented the appearance of the trucks involved
in the collision. (R.. 385). That the highway is 19¥2 feet
wide wher.e the accident occurred and is a two-lane highway with a yellow line separating the traffic lanes. (R.
386) He observed quite a bit of debris along the east side
of the paved portion of the highway . There was a track
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indicating \Yhere the pick-up truck had begun to be
pushed by the other truck located on the edge of the
shoulder. The shoulder was about 3 feet wide. (R. 387)
The pick-up truck 'vas pushed approxi1nately 14 feet by
the other truck. (R. 388). The defendants' truck had
covered a distance of 30 feet fro1n what ap'peared to be
the point of in1pact before coming to rest. ·The debris he
saw at the supposed point of impact con~sisted of glass
and pieces of chrome and the ordinary things you would
see at an accident. (R. 395) Van Patten told the Sheriff
that he first noticed danger of collision when the distance
bet,veen the two trucks on the highway was between 20
to 25 feet. (R. 502).
William ~1:. l\iitchell testified that he was father of
the plaintiff, and a passenger in the pick-up; truck· at the
time of the accident. He was s·eated on the right hand side
of the truck. (R. 396) He kept his eye on the shoulder
of the road as they proceeded in the dust in order to see
if they were in the road. The truck was right on the edge
of the road. He did not obse:rve the truck he was in go
\vest of the center line at any time. (R. 398) He saw the
Arrowhead truck before the collision occurred. It was
maybe 30 or 40 feet away . Plaintiff's truck 'vas just
about stop·ped when he first saw the Arrowhead truck.
Plaintiff had turned out to wait for the dust storm he
supposed. They were just about off the paved portion
of the highway. (R. 399-400) The driver of the Arrowhead truck called upon the witness William ~I. Mitchell,
at the hospital, and stated to the \vitness at the hospital,
that he, 'Tan Patten, was totally and wholly responsible
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for the accident. (R. 505)
Dr. L. \T. Broadbent testified that he savv Van Patten
on the second floor of the Iron County Hospital in the
1norning a day or two after the accident. That Van Patten asked the doctor how the victims were and stated:
''I am awfully upset, I have to go talk to these people.
I have got to talk to them. It was entirely my fault.''
(R. 2·55)

Lay Evidence showing perma;nent ilnjury to
plaintiff. ~and rp1ermalnent impairment of his .e~arn
ing capacity.
The defendants' summary of the evidence, both lay
and medical, as it pertained to the injuries suffered by
the plaintiff and to the permanent impairment of his
earning capaeity is unfair and incomplete.
vVith respect to the per1na.nency of his injury and
with respect to the permanent impairment of his earning
capRcity, the pJaintiff, Mr. Mitchell, at piage 245 of the
record, testified as folloV\rs:

'' Q.

Now did you state whether or not you
·experience any pain or discomfort in the vicinity
of your-the back of your neck~
A. Always from the beginning, that was
the very painful part.
Q. What eff·ect did that have upon your
movement of your head~

A. Well, the movement has been quite restricted ever since the accident.
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Q.

Does that eondition persist to the present

time!
..A_. Yes, not as inten8e as it was at the beginning, though, and fe\v n1onths now, I have noticed
no improven1ent.

Q. The past fe,v n1onths there has been no
improvement in the condition of your neck~
...-\..

I think that's right.''

_._.\gain at page 246 of the record:
,-,{ell state \vether or not you suffer any
pain or discomfort in the movement of your head
at the present time~
Q.

A. I do; I can move my head to an extent,
and beyond that, it is very painful, and, if I persist, it just feels like I am in a blackout
How far can you move your head without
pain; will you demonstrate to the jury~
Q.

th~t

A.

I can move it

Q.

Can you move it in either

A.

Yes.

Q.

_._-\.bout the saln·e

far (indicates).
direction~

extent~

A. I think so, maybe a little better to the
left than I can to the right.
Q. Will you demonstrate that again, so that
I can have the record indicate about the extent
to which you can 1nove your head without pain~
MR WHITE : May the r·ecord show that the
center of the chin, on the n1ovement of the head
to the right at the present time, is. a matter of
about an inch and a half or two inches from the
center line of the neck.
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~fR

CANNON: I am not the record stater
of distances.
MR WHITE: If you have any dispute, express it now, or would you like to state it differ·
ently, Mr. Cannon~
MR. CANNON: Oh, I think we are willing to
take your statement, Mr. White, as long as we
don't get into any misunderstandings later about
it.
Q. Now, will you describe again the pain
that you suffer when you move your head beyond
that point~

A. Well, there is always pain in the back
of n1y head, the bas·e of my head, and that pain,
of course, goes up, it feels like it is right in the
top of my head part of the time. If I try to turn
my head, seems right here in the neck stops me.
Its just-its quite painful and just makes me
feel like I am going t:o go right off.

Q. Now, are you able to drive your automobile at the present time~
A. Yes, I can drive it under certain conditions .

.Q.

What conditions do you refer to?

A. Oh, I can drive the automobile pretty
good shape, of-as long as I am going do,vn the
highway, why everything is all right.
Q. Well, are there any driving conditions
that you can't do~
A. Well, it is extremely difficult for me
to do any reversing; I can't see what is happ~en
ing from the back. Backed into a ditch a few
times.
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Q. No,v, while we are on this, Mr. Mitchell,
I understand that at the present time you are engaged in farniing~
r\..

That's right.

Q. ..._-\..re you restricted at all, in your physical
activities 'vith reference to performing your far1n
duties!
. .-\... I a1n quite definitely restricted; there is
a good many things I can't do on a farm. (R. 247)
Q. 'Vill you state to what extent that you
are so restricted; what are some of the things you
cannot do~

A. vVell, when it comes to strenuous physical work, I don't do ·that well. I can drive my
tractor, but it isn't very satisfactory to try to ·
plo'v a field, or anything of the kind, when you
ean't 'vatch to see what is happening to the plow.
It is just guesswork. Drilling grain, or something
like that, I don't try to do.
~IR.

CANNON: What is that ?
0

A. Drilling grain, driving tractor, pulling
the drill.

Q. Now in connection with your farm operations. do you run any sheep or cattle~
. A..

Yes. I have a few sheep and some cattle.

Q. And, in connection with that typ~ of
\vork, is it necessary for you to frequently ride
horseback')?
. A..

Oh, yes.

Q. N ovv, do you suffer any disability or discoinfort when you are riding horseback~
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A.

Well-

(I~.

248)

A. Yes, I suffer disc9mfort riding horses,
and I let them walk around mostly, now. (R. 249)
\V ell, now, you describe to what extent
you suffer inconvenience or discomfort when
you are riding a horse'
Q.

A. Well, anybody that has ridden a horse,
of course knows that there is 1nore or less jarring
up there, and that affects the head. That's all ·
there is to that.
Now, to what extent are you able to ride
horses at all~
Q.

A. I can ride horses, trusty horses, all right,
if I take it easy.
State is there any particular gait of the
horse you can't ride without disco1nfort ~
Q.

A. \V ell, I don't usually get then1 off the
walk. I presu1ne I could by taking the punishment, that I don't try.
No,v, do you have any feeling of pain,
or discon1fort when you attempt to lift any heavy
Q.

object~

A. Well, very· difinitely. It bothers n1e in
the back of the neck and head, it just seen1s to
kind of pull.
Do you have any.-in connection \vith
your ranching activities, do yon raise feed for
your cattle~
Q.

A.

That's right, that-

Q.

Do yon have

anY

clisco1nfort 1n connPr-
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tion 'Yith the harvesting of your feed crops for
the cattle?
. A... ''Tell, that, of course, al,vays involves
lifting, and the ·pitching of hay, and things like
that: those all.A...

No.

Q. Are you able to pitch hay at the present
tin1e, 'Yithout pain °?
Q. N o,v, .3Ir. ~fitchell, do you suffer any diseomfort at the present tim·e in any other area than
in the back of your neck~
. A..

Yes, in a good many areas.

Q. Will you just state where you suffer discomfort at the present time~

A.

Well-

Q.

Let's start from the top down.

A. In the nose area, there seems to be some
pressure here yet, which is annoying, affects my
breathing to an extent; the ear feels-oh, like
there is a string tied around the base of it, and
it is quite tender, and, at the same time, it feels
stiff to me, like might rub it off if you were not
careful, and the jaw is ·extren1ely miserable.
Q. Will you describe a little more, with a
little more p·articularity, the misery you suffer in
the use of your jaw~

A. That's pretty hard thing to describe, but
in the region close to the one ear here, there's
some pain.
Q.

May the record-

A.

Always.
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MR. WHITE : May the record show the witness has reference to the upper portion of the left
jaw in the vicinity of the ear~
Q. Now, when do you suffer that ;pain~ Under what conditions of the movement of your jaw
does that give you pain'

A. Well, there is an ugly sensation there
practically all of the time ; lot in this area when
I try to use the jaw in talking or eating, and feels
lil\!e it''S just sort of artifici:al, and it's quite a difficult thing for me to use it. As you notice, I use
it, butI observe that you give some appearanoe
of talking through your teeth, or with your mouth
partly npen; how far can youQ.

MR. CANNON: Now. just a minute, we object
to counsel's questions in that form, and suggesting matters as to what he notices; seems to meMR WHITE: Haven't you observed that, Mr.
Cannon~

MR. CANNON: I have observedAsk you this, Mr. Mitchell, how far can
you open your mouth at the present time without
pain~ (R. 251)
Q.

A.

Well-

Q.

You de1nonstrate it for the jury.

A. I don't know how far.
Q. How far can you open your mouth at all,
either with or without pain~
A. Well, that is about it. I never be·en able
to open it too wide.
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(~.

,\:~ill

you just de1nonstrate that again,
then I can indicate it on the record.
~IR. CANNON: ''' e will say for the purpose

of the record that the witness didn't open his
n1outh all the way. (R. 252)
~lr.

l\Iitchell gaYe further testimony touching upon
per1nanaent injury and impairment of his earning capacity eommencing at page 316 of the record:
Q. N o,v, ~Ir. ~fitchell, you've testified formerly that you continued to suffer from stiffness
of the neck and pain on motion of the head, and
also some restrietion of motion in the use of your
ja,v, and some pain in your jaw, is that correct.

. A_.

That is correct.

Q. Have you suffered from any other continuing conditions up to this time~
_.r\.. Well, yes, my, my breathing is eonsiderably impaired.

Q.

Now. just describe how that's affected

you.
A. Well, there is, seems to be a little pressure on n1y nose there as though it were being
pressed down from above, of course.

Q. Now, is your breathing impaired through
your n1outh or through your nose~
A.

Through the nose.

Q. I see; no\Y. do you suffer from any other
eonditions, in addition to that~
A. Well, I think perhaps you asked me about
it here once. That's condition there that's quite
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difficult; it's painful, 1niserable, feels like it is
tied up, and it is annoying because of the aperture
into the ear is small, considerably smaller than
the other one.
Q.

Now. Mr. Mitchell, how is your condition

A. Well, I have extreme difficulty getting
any rest. I-when I get real tired, I can lie down
with respect to your ability to sleep at night~
and sleep maybe an hour and a half and two hours,
and then I sleep very little. I just cat nap after
that. I haven't had a night's rest for a long time.
State whether or not that condition has
con tinned since the date of the accident.
Q.

A. That's entirely right. The condition, of
course, I think was worse immediately after the
accident, worse than it is now. I had difficulty
sleeping at all lying down. I think I still can sleep
better sitting up than lying do·wn.
Are there any positions that-that is, reclining positions that it is uncomfortable for you
to sleep in or lie in~
Q.

A. Yes, definitely; on my back or my left
side, not able to lie on my left side.
What is the experience you have when
you attempt to lie on your left side.
Q.

A. vVell, there is considerable pain in the
ear area, and I just don't try.
vVhat is your experience when you attempt to lie on your back~
Q.

A. Well, this head situation seems to increas:e; the pain in the head is increased; just
can't do it and sleep.
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Q. No,v, aside fron1 the pain in the head
that you have described, which results from the
moven1ent of your head, do you suffer any other
headaches or things of that kind~
A. Well, there is a continual ache in the
back across the base of my head.

Q.

How severe is that at the present time!

..:\... Well, it's present all the time. !There are
some times, of course, when I get real interested
in something else, that I am not entirely aware of
it, but the moment I relax at all, I am always concious of the pain in my head.

Q. Is that pain more severe or less severe
than it was soon after the accident, say~
..._~.

It's less severe than it was right after.

Q.

I see; hllt at any rate it

A.

That's right.

continues~

Q. Now, Mr. Mitchell, do you have any difficulty in eating your food?

A.

Yes, I do.

Q. Will you just describe to what ·extent you
have difficulty and in eating particular types of
food~

A. Well, I simply don't get my mouth open
wide enough to eat some types of food. If I ever
try to eat a sandwich, I nibble one part of it at a
tim·e, and anything like steak, I don't try, usually.
Now, have you had any difficulty in the
use of your hands since the accident~
Q.

A. Yes, considerable difficulty. They were
quite useless at first, but they have improved
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som-e; the left hand has made more improvement
than the right.
What was the nature of the injury, if you
know, that you suffered to your left hand~
Q.

A. \Veil, of course, I don't know, ·except
that it was terribly swollen and sore, and later
on an ex-ray indicated that the hand was broken
in the area here on the back.
Q.

Do you know who took that particular

x-ray~

A. Dr. Paul Richards of the Bingham Cany·on Clinic.
Q.

Was that the information he gave

A.

That's right.

you~

Now, with respect to your right hand,
you sa:: you also suffered some pain in your right
Q.

hand~

-'-~·

It was swollen for a long time, and it has
continued sorer than the other one; seems to have
been sprained in this little finger area, and also
on the bone continuing up from the little finger.
Q. Does that discomfort continue up to the
present time in your hands~

A.

It does.

Q.

Is it severe or less severe than it was

formerly~

A.

It's less severe, very definitely. (R. 319)

Mr. Mitchell testified that prior to the accident, his
general health had al,vays been good. That for 24 years
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decton1y . he had never n1i8Se(l a dny of srltool on aeeount
of his health. (R. 323)
,,. . ith referenc.e to his present inability to teach
~chool, the plaintiff testified as follows:
Q. '': ould you be able, from a ph y sic a l
standpoint, to carry on your vocation as a school
teacher or school superintendent at the present
time?

. A_.
~chool

I wouldn't want to try to continue my
vvork at the present time.

And \v·hy not~
A. I just simply f·eel like I couldn't handle
it this year.
Q. Why wouldn't you be able to handle it~
_.A_. Well, in the first place, I would simply
give out. It tires 1ne terrible to sit here in the
courtroom. I don't think I could do that, and
· the neck and jaw handicap I think, would make
it quite in1possible for me to do a reasonable good
job in a school.'' (R. 331-332)
Q.

On cross-examination, the plaintiff testified that although his headaches had diminished quite considerably,
they w.ere still with him. That they vvere quite 'Constant;
that he gets to doing something sometime and becomes
unC'onscious of the presence of 'the 'headache, hut the very
Inoment he relaxes the least bit, he is always conscious
that the headache is there. (R. 344) The witness further
testified, on cross-examination, that he eould driv·e a tractor and ride his horse on a walk but he could not sow his
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crops. ( R. 353)
JYir. ~Iitchell testified, that he had always· had in
111ind that if the right kind of opportunity came to continue his s-chool work and managed the p~rop~erty at Parowan. That he ~htad intended to come to Parowan, where his
farn1 property vv~a.s, and ranch property, and to first
of all get that in condition so that it 'vould operate properly, and then if conditions arose whereby he
could continue his school work, he had always expected
to do that. ( R. 359-360)

MEDICAL EVIDENCE OF PERMANENT INJURY
AND OF INJURY p·ERMANENTLY IMPAIRING
PLAINTIFF'S EARNING CAPACITY.
DOCTOR KENNE'TH LE~WIS DEDEKIND testified that he was a specialist in oral surgery, as a Dentist.
Dr. Dedekind testified that the upper right lateral inci~or tooth had been fractured off and also. the upper right
first bicuspid. That there was also a s·hadow app~earing
on the films that indicated pos~sibly one of the· 1tie·eifu was
knocked com_pletely out, \vhich vv-ould indicate a second
bicusp~id. The x-ray fi!1mS: taken were rather limited in
their scope. They did not show the entire jaw, but that
portion of the jaw which supports the teeth. (R. 171-2)
16 teeth are norn1ally present in the upper jaw. At the
time of th x-1·ay, there vvere 12 teeth in place in the upper
jaw. Of those 12 teeth there were possibly 9 that showed
no evidence of any harm. (R. 172) A visual inspection of
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tioned before had been fraetured and broken off probably
by son1e severe blo\v, and the Yisual ex~unination was confirined by the x-ray. It vvonld not have been useful or
practicable to atte1npt to repair the teeth, other than by
the removal of those that vvere re1naining, and the ug.e of
a plate. There \Yonld have been no use in trying to sav·e
him anything injasmuch as the only tee-th pT'actically
that '\Vould have been left vvould be his upper back teeth,
vvhich would not support a denture very vve1l from a
1nechanical standpoint. And so it was decided in conjunction with Dr. 1.;Varburton, who subsequently made
~Ir. ~fitchell's denh1re, that it would probably be best
to remove all remaining upper teeth and those two on
the lovver ja "'" that \Vere affected as well, and make him
a restoration. The doctor stated that the fact that the
nerves had be-en exposed by virtue of the c.ro,vns having
been sheared off, would cause the patient to suffer considerable pain. On July 23, 1947, three of the teeth wer·e
ren1oved, and on September 12, 1947, 11 more were reInoved making a total of 14. (R. 174) That included all
of the teeth in the upper jaw and tvvo teeth in the lower
jaw (R.. 175) \'le quote from Dr. Dedekind's testin1ony
at the botton1 of page 185 and the top of page 186:
But so far as his use of the javvs were
concerned, what would you say~
Q.

A. His ja\\T~ \Vere solid, and, if he \vas able
to \V·ear a denture, of course, he would have the
inconvenience of eating without his own teeth,
but he \Vonld be able to take nourishment all right.
Q.

And talk all right, would

he~
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A.

Yes, he could talk.

A. Let me say this, at the time thes-e x-rays
were taken, I noticed quite a bit of limitation in
the ability of Mr. Mitchell to open his mouth so
that we could get the films in, and whethe,r that
has improved sinee then or not, or since his denture was made, I don't know." (R. 186')
Again on p~age 187, Dr. Dedekin·d testifi·ed as follows:

Q. Dr. Dedekind, you say that at the time
you attempted to insert the paraphernalia for the
x-ray pictures, you obs·erved some restriction in
the mobility of 1\fr. ~{itchell's jaw~
A.

I did.

Q. It seemed to he difficult for him to open
his mouth at that tin1e ~
A.

That is correct.

DR. L. V. BROADBENT testified that he vvas physician and surgeon practicing at Cedar City, Utah. (R. 189)
That he is a partner in operating the Southern Utah
Clinic (R. 190) That he first saw the plaintiff on April
3, 1947, when he was brought to the hospital, where he
had been admitted in a semi-conscious condition, suffering from shock, and it \Vas apparent that he had some
severe damage to his loweT jaw. (R. 191) He wasn't
clear enough so that he could be questioned until the
following morning. There \Vas apparently some cerebral
or brain depression, lessening consciousness, from the
doctor's observation. (R-. 192) He was suffering from a
1noderate brain depression. There was some beginning
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over his eyes and about the pro1ninences of the
cheeks~ and he had ntunerous cuts and lacerations of the
face. (R. 1~)~1) 'The n1ost n1arked laceration was the region of the left ear, and that ear 'vas cut from below,
that is a.t a point where attached on to the head and behnY, up,Yards to above the canal cutting directly through
the ear canal, leaving approxin1ately one-fifth of the
tissue still attached to the skull, to the head. And there
\\~as an area roughly triangular in shape behind the ear
over what 've call the mastoid area or, bony prominence
behind the ear, about an inch and a half in size from
whieh ;the skin was ahnost en tirely gone, with the ·exception of a small pedicle. (R. 194) Except for the upper
one-fifth of the ear, it was completely detached from th~e
head. (R. 195) The part of the ear that was detached
from the head 'vould have necessarily severed some of
those nerve connection and there \vould undoubtedly he
some altered sensation there, unless the nerve was regenerated. Dr. Broadbent would exp·ect that injury to the
nerves in the ear to be a permanent condition. (R. 196)
The x-ray pictures disclosed three fractures of the
ja\v. ( R. 199) There was a fracture on the left side
just in front of the angle of the jaw. That was a compound fracture. l\. compound fracture is a fracture in
which either the skin or mucous membrane or lining
of the mouth and jaws is broken and the bone protrudes
through. In this case, it was compounded on the inside
and not externally, that is, co1npounded on the inside
of the n1outh. There was a ragged break of bone there.
The fracture was described as comp1ounded, comminuted
1
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because of the segmented little fragments in the bone.
It was a seve-re fracture. There was a simple fracture
of the Icnver jaw on the left side of the point of the chin.
(R. 202) There was a compound fracture also on the
right side of the lower jaw. It was a severe fracture.
A double fracture of the jaw was naturally more serious
than a single. (R. 203) During the 13 days that the
Dr. Broadbent treated the plaintiff there was a great
deal of swelling about his nose and over around his
left eye, with a great deal of discoloration around the
eye. The left eye was swollen almost completely shut.
(R. 211) He had had some hemorrhage around the ·eyeball itself which would indicate a severe damage to
the blood vessels due to an external force, an external
violence. (R. 212) Clinically it was Dr. Broadbent's
opinion and the opinion of his associates that the plaintiff had a skull fracture. The clinical symp'toms which
\vere present, whieh indieated the possibility of skull
fracture, consisted of the swelling about the nose, and
the eyes, and the hemohrrage into ·the tissue about the
eye. (R. 214) Dr. Broadbent was unable to demonstrate
to his satisfaction any fracture of the cervical vertebrae,
but the plaintiff complained of severe pain about the
level of the fourth cervical vertebra and the witness was
looking particularly for fracture in that area. (R. 217)
\Vi tness was unable to diagnose a definite skull fracture
fro1n the X-rays. The witness susp.ected a fracture of
the cervical vertebrae by reason of the persistent pain
of a definitely localized spot in the neck which did not
in1prove. \Yith the passing of time (R. 225) We quote
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fro1n page :2:10 of the record for son1e direct testhnony
from Dr. Broadbent:
'• Q. .:\.. further question in that connection,
Dr. Broadbent: You said that there may have
been injury to the ligrunents in the neck, which
\vould create a result similar to a fracture of the
bone: is that correct~

. .\_. Purely hypothetical. Yes, it could have
happened.
Q. Now, Doctor, there are times when the
injuries to the liga1nents and the muscles in the
soft tissue in the vicinity of the neck may persist
indefinitely, and even for a longer period than
the sympton1s fro1n bone fracture, is not that
correct"?
. ._;\_. I an1 not prepared to say how long they
could last.

But \vhat I an1 asking is this, Doctor.
not the damage to the ligaments or muscles
of the neck be even more severe and cause more
limitation of n1otion and things of that chaarcter
than an actual fracture of the bone~
Q.

}[ay

A. It could be equal to. I don't feel, p'ersonally, that it should be excessive. It could he equal
to.
Q. And, as far as you kno\v, that condition
n1ay or may not continue for an indefinite period
of time after the injury, depending upon the
severity of the injury~
A. It \Yould be indefinite period-definitely
an indefinite period.''

DR. F. W. BUTLER testified that he was a physici!an
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and surgeon practicing at Safford, Arizona. That in
addition to his M.D. degree, he had had two refresher
courses at the Mayo Clinic at R.ochester, and one European post-graduate clinical course in 1937. That he
began his practice July 1, 1926, and had p·racticed continuously since that time. (R. 2·59) That hetween 5 and
10 per cent of his practice is industrial work. That he
has serv~ed as a referee on the industrial commission of
Arizona, for two years. He has had numerous occasions
to treat many types of bone injuries and cases involving
surgery. Five per cent of his daily practice would be
referable to accident industrial work. (R. 260) Dr. Butler
saw and t:veated the plaintiff commencing April 22, 1947:
(R. 2.61)
'' Q. What did his condition appear to he,
so far as you could observe at that time, when
you first called upon him~

A. Well, he was obviously in a great deal of
·pain. He had a fracture of the lower jaw, or
mandible. The jaws were wired together at that
time. He had a very deep cut in around his left
ear, with numerous sutures in his ear that had·
not been removed, and he had extensive multiple
cuts involving the left ear and the left side of
his neck.
Q. Did you observe any other cuts on any
other portion of his body at that time?

A. He had other cuts, but I don't have a
too descriptive location of them. His face was
swollen; his left eye was swollen and discolored;
his neck was stiff and painful upon attempting
to move his head; he could not open his mouth
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beca.use his teeth \Yere fastened together.
Q. \V" ere the teeth fastened together by this
\Yire arrangement for the jaw~
\
...~.

"'leS.
7" ' ·~

Dr. Butler testified that the plaintiff's whole face
and neck ".,.as s"\vollen rather extensively and that the soft
tissue arolmd his left eye was swollen too. (R. 262) From
~\.pril 22, until about May 9, Dr. Butler saw the plaintiff approximately every other day. The plaintiff came
to his office on May 9, for x-ray study ·of his head and
neck and ja-\v. The doctor took x-ray pictures on the 9th
of ~lay, 1947, which were marked plaintiff's exhibits
~!i_, B, and C. ( R. 263-264) Dr. Butler stated that he had
O"\V~ed his own x-ray machine for 16 years and had interpreted his own pictures to the satisfaction of the industrial commission for 16 years. He had daily occasion
to interpret x-ray pictures in his practice of medicine
and surgery, with an ·average irrterp•retation of not less
than one dozen films a day probably. He testified that
Exhibit A disclosed a fracture of the mandible in two
different places, a comminuted fracture-that means a
fracture that is through and a p·iece of bone broken off.
(R. 267) The doctor testified that the plaintiff had a
fracture of the upper jaw or the maxilla involving the
dental processes in and around the first and second molars upper left with a comminuted fracture of the dental
processes. (R. 268) We quote directly from the doctor's
testimony commencing at the battom of page 268 of the
record:
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"Q. N O\V, doctor, I hand you Exhibit C, and
I wiH ask you to show what Exhibit C represents.
A. Exhibit C confir1ns the above statement
relative to fracture of the lower jaw and of the
upper JaW.
Let me ask you, Doctor, what view Exhibit C represents.
Q.

A. That is a lateral view of the face, neck
and base of the skull. It confirms the above staten1ent and brings out other evidence that was not
visible in the previous x-ray, that is a fracture
in the body of the first cervical vertebra; a comminuted chip about one-fifth the size of the body
of the first cervical vertebra. There is some evidence of an injury to the orbit and involving the
frontal sinuses; that is referable to the sockets of
the eye. It is indicated to me that there has been
a fracture of the front part of the skull involving
the left orbit and extending up to the fronta1
sinus, left side. There is some evidence of a
change in the consistency of the tissue in and
around involving the first and second cervical
vertebra.
Q.

What does that change indicate,

Doctor~

A. They indicate trauma, or bony changes
as the result of trauma.
Q.

What do you mean by ''tranma')T

A.

Injury.

State whether or not that condition of
fracture and the subsequent changes that you
have just testified to would have any effect upon
the movement of the neck~
Q.

A.

\rery definite limited motion.
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Q.

State ho'v that occurs.

~\.

Bec-ause the first t\vo vertebra of the neck
support the atlas and axis. It is just like a pool
ball \Yith a hole in it sitting on an axis or a pin
that rotates back and forth.
In connection 'vith the condition of Mr.
~Iitchell·s neck at that ti1ne in the vicinity of the
first cervical vertebra, did you make any external
obserYation of the patient aside from the x-ray
pictures'
Q.

~l.

He had pain on deep pressure in and
around his neck. He complained of some pain
in his upper extremities.
Did you apply pressure to the neck in
the ''icinity of the first cervical vertebra at that
Q.

time~

A.

Yes.

Q. Now, Doctor, I will ask you, in view of
your experience in the diagnosis and treatment
of conditions of this type, if you have an opinion
as to the length of time which would be required
for the patient to recover from an injury to the
neck as indicated by the x-ray pictures and by
your observations at that time~ You may indicate "yes" or "no" if you have such an opinion.
A.

Yes.

Q.

What is that

opinion~

A. My opinion is that an injury of the neck
of this nature naturally will result in S'ome disability.

Q. What I mean, Doctor, is do you have an
opinion as to \vhether such an injury \vill be perSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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n1anent or heal
A.

completely~

(R. 270)

It will be of a permanent nature. (R. 271)

Q. Doctor, do you have an opinion as to
whether or not the patient's use of his neck, the
movement of his head, will be restricted permanently~

A. Yes, I am sure there will be some limitation of motion there.
·
Q. Have you as a physician and surgeon
had occasion to treat injuries involving fracture
of the cervical vertebra~

A.

Yes, I have had several in my experience.

Q. Now, Doctor, I will ask you whether in
view of your experience you have an opinion as
to whether or not an injury to the first cervical
vertebra as shown by Exhibit C will be permanent
or temporary~

A. There will be a certain per cent of permanent disability.
Q. I will ask you again, Doctor, if you have
an opinion as to whether or not the patient 'vill
suffer a permanent restriction of the mo hili ty of
the head and neck~

A. There will be a permanent limitation of
the motion in all spheres.
Q.

What do you mean by ''all

spheres''~

. A.. Side, lateral, up, down, back-aU spheres
of motion.

Doctor, do you have an opinion as to
whether or not this process of calcification or deposit of hone in the vicinity of the first cervical
Q.
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vertebra \vould continue into the future, or will
ceaset
. . _.\_.

\ . .es.

Q.

Doctor, what is that

opinion~

~-\..

:JI y observation has been with similar
cases that severe injury involving a joint. of a
vertebra very frequently results in a condition
called traumatic arthritis, or an arthritic ·condition of the intervertebral joint or articulation.
(R. 272)
Q. No,v, Doctor, do you have an opinion as
to whether or not an injury to the neck of the
type indicated by Plaintiff's Exhibit C would have
a tendency to produce pain upon the movement of
the head~

A.

It would.

Q. Now, Doctor, do you have an opinion as
to whether or not injuries to the neck and jaw
and orbit, as you have testified to with respect
to these exhibits, could result from natural causes
or would be due to a traumatic injury?

A. It would of necessity be due to a severe
injury or blow; it could not result from natural
causes." (R. 273)
We again quote Dr. Butler's testimony frorn page
275 of the record:
•'Q. Doctor, do you have an opinion as to
whether or not the plaintiff has suffered a permanent partial loss of bodily function by reason
of the injuries that he was suffering from at the
time you examined and treated him~
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A.

Yes.

Q.

What is that

opinion~

A. The opinion is based on the severity and
the degree of the injury, that there will be some
permanent impairment of bodily functions, probably early fatigue; a tendency to"TNard traumatic
neurosis and p·ossibly a tendency to develop posttraumatic esthenia. That is on the basis of observation where the vital organs were injured,
or severe head injuries or severe -crushing injuries of the chest were suffered. A ·big per cent
of individuals that have experienced that type of
injuries have more or less phlegmatic attitude
toward attacking problems of any magnitude.''
. (R. 275)
Dr. Butler further testified on page 282 of the reeord as follows:

"Q. None of ~fr. Mitchell's bones were
broken in any joints, were they~
A. Yes, the cervical vertebra there involves
the joint. The first cervical vertebra is fractured
into the joint." (R. 282)
Again from page 283 of the record:
'' Q. There could not be any arthritis from
any of the breaks that you saw, with the possible
exception of the cervical vertebra~

A. Well, there is a possibility that he will
develop arthritis in the articulation of the jaw
on both sides." (R. 283)
Counsel at page 17, of their brief, in reviewing Dr.
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to the effect that the plaintiff had n1ade a wonderful recovery. He would n·ot say a complete recovery but
that he had Inade a remarkable comeback. Dr. Butler explained that the statement on re-direct ·examination as
follo,vs:

lllPnt

· · Q. Doctor, 'vhen you stated on cross-exa.I11ination that the patient had made a remarkable come-back but not a co1uplete recovery, what
did you mean by that'?

A. Well, I had still in my mind that the
last time I SR\V him he had this limitation of n1otion in his neck and he had pain in his jaw and
quite a lot of nervousness.' (R. 287)
Cotmsel either with a deliberate or in an inadvertent
attempt to mislead the court, quoted the last portion of
Dr. Butler's testimony as an indication of the way he
su1umed up his testimony as a whole, rather than asan explanation of the statement he had made on crossexamination with respect to the ·extent of recovery. (See
defendant's brief, p. 17)
DR. REED SMOOT CLEGG, testifying on behalf of
plaintiff, stated that he 'vas a graduate of Northwestern
University and was resident and surgical interne at Saint
Luke's hospital in Chicago, the orthopedic section, 11ayo
Clinic, Rochester, Minnesota, for three years, and in the
.A_rmy for three and a half years. (R. 288) That while
he "\vas in the arn1y, he was engaged in orthopedic surgery, and that he has established a specialization in the
field of orthopedic surgery, whirh special practice, he
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has followed for 11 years. That he first examined the
plaintiff on January 15, 1948. (R. 289) The doctor testified with respect to this first examination as follows:
Doctor, while the clerk is marking the
x-rays, what did your examination, aside from the
x-ray findings, disclose at that time?
'' Q.

A. I found several things wrong; I will refer to my notes, andQ.

Are those notes which you made at that

tin1e1
A. Yes, sir, these are my office notes. No.1
is a healed fracture of the left mandible; No. 2
absence partial teeth; No. 3, healed scar of the
left ear; No. 4, area of anesthesia about the left
ear and left side of the chin.
Q. What is meant by that term, Doctor?
A. That's loss of sensation in that area.
No. 5, healed rib fracture, seventh on the left
side~ No. 6, anklyosis or limitation of motion,
partial fibrous of the cervical spine or neck; No.

7Doctor, at that point, may I inquire as
to what extent the anklyosis of the neck appeared
to be a.t that time 1
A. l\{odera.te limitation of motion in all directions." (R. 290)
Q. Now, you have testified that was in all
directions, movement of the head in all directions 1
A. There was some limitation of motion in
all directions.
Q. What other observations did you make,
Doctor?
Q.
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. A.. X o. 7, has apparent healed fracture of
the nasal bone, with deviation of nasal septum to
the left. That is the nose bone. No.8, is ankylosis,
partial fibrous slight of left thumb in the op·ponens direction; and, No. 9, is anklyosis partial
fibrous temporal mandibular .
.A..

Temporal mandibular.

Q.

·\Vill you explain-

...\..

Or jaw joint.

Q.

You mean, then, which jaw, Doctor'

~\.

\Vell, we speak-there is only motion

in the lower jaw.

Q. I see; at that time, you then observed a
restriction of motion in the lower jaw~
~-\.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Did you make any other observations,

Doctor~

.A..

I believe that's all." (R. 291)

'\rith respect to the x-rays taken by Dr. F. \V. Butler,
of Safford, Arizona, Dr. Clegg testified as follows: (R.
~DG)

'' Q. Now, Doctor, I will show you Exhibit
C in this case, which, under the testimony in this
record, represents an x-ray picture taken on the
9th ·day of May, 1947, by Dr. F. W. Butler in Safford, Arizona, and I will ask you if, calling your
attention to the cervical vertebra indicated on this
x-ray·, I "rill ask you if you observed any abnorInalities on the x-ray~

A.

I do.
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Q.

What abnormalities do you

observe~

A. There is an area of roughness in front,
or anterior to the first cervical vertebra.
Q. Just what do you mean, Doctor, by that~
A. There is an abnormal bony prominence
in this area.

Doctor, state whether or not there is any
evidence of bone chip in that area.
Q.

A. Yes, sir, this deformity may be the result of a chip fracture. (R. 297)
Now doctor, have you had occasion to
examine Mr. Mitchell subsequent to this first
Q.

examination~

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

When did you next examine

him~

A. Well, last examination was the-I believe, it was the 20th of April, 1948.
And did you observe any changes in his
condition at that time~
Q.

A.

Yes.

Q.

What changes did you

observe~

A. Well, there had been some improvement
in the motion of the left hand-let's see-1 believe that is the only significant change.
So that, excep1t for that change, the p:resent diagnosis-at any rate, the one you made on
the 20th of April of this year-would be identical
vvith the one made at your first examination~
Q.

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Now, Doctor, assuming that the ·p·laintiff,
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r.Iitehell, \Yas injured, sustained these injuries
to his neck and ja\\r on the first day-on the third
day of ~-\.pril, .l~l-±7, and, in vie\Y of your experience as an orthopedic surgeon, and, in view of
the inforn1ation you have at hand that you have
testified to in court relative to your examination
of :ilir. ~Iitchell, do you have an opinion as to
\\~hether or not the ankylosis of the jaw, which
you have testjfied to, \vill be permanent 1n any
extent? (R. 297)
Q.

You have such an

~\..

Yes, sir.

Q.

What is that

opinion~

opinion~

. .\. I believe there will be some permanent
limitation of the n1otion, or ankylosis. (R. 398)

N o,v, Doctor, relative to the condition
'vhich you observed of Mr. ~1:itchell in connection
with the ankylosis of the cervical vertebra and
the restriction of the motion of his head, in view
of the examination which you have made of Mr.
:\Iitehell, and, in view of the x-ray finding indicated by Exhibit C, and, in view of your experience as an orthopedic surgeon, do you have
an opinion as to whether or not this ankylosis or
restriction of motion in the neck will be a permanent condition, to any extent~
Q.

opinion~

Q.

You have such an

A.

I do.

Q.

What is that opinion"?

A. I would exp·ect there would be some limitation of motion.
Q.

My question was, Doctor, whether or not
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you would expect such limitation to be permanent~

A.

Yes, sir, I would. ( R. 299)

Q. Doctor, I will show you an Exhibit G,
which Dr. Broadbent has testified to was an x-ray
picture taken by-under his sup·ervision-at the
Iron County Hospital of Mr. Mitchell, either the.
day. after, or period immediately following the
injuries which Mr. Mitchell suffered to his jaw,
and I will ask you if you observe any fractures
indicated in the jaw on this picture~

A.

I do.

Will you point those fractures out, and
describe them, if you can~
Q.

A. This side of the jaw is labelled "L",
probably referring to "left." There is a line
of fracture with smaller pieces of bone knocked
off in this area, which is a comminuted or multiple
fracture of the jaw on the left side.
Q.

You :observe any other fractures.

(R.

300)

On the right side, we have a similar type of
fracture in the jaw, which is evident here.
Q. When you say, ''similar type,'' you mean
that also was a compound comminuted fracture,
I take it~

A.

It is a comminuted fracture.

I will ask you, Doctor, if Exhibit F discloses any fractures of the jaw~
Q.

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And where are those indicated t
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i\.. Fracture line evident through here, and
not Yery clear, probably in this area there.

Q. I think you may take the stand. Now,
Doctor, do ~rou have an opinion, in view of your
training and experience, and, in vie'v of the facts
disclosed by your examinations of Mr. Mitchell,
as to whether or not this area of anesthesia in
the vicinity of the lip ":ill be a permanent injury
or not'
Doctor~

Q.

You have such an opinion

_..-\_.

I do.

Q.

What is your

~-\.

I believe that it will be pennanent.

( R.

301)
opinion~

Q. Now, D'Octor, in view of your experience
as an orthopedic specialist, and, in view of the
findings-x-ray and otherwise-you have made
through the examinations of Mr. Mitchell, do you
have an opinion as to whether this condition of
anklyosis of the neck and the jaw would have a
tendency to produce pain~
_._-\.

I do.

Q.

What is that opinion o?

A.

It might.

Q.

Now, what do you mean by that, Doctor'

A. In attempts to turn the neck more than
the limiting tissues allow, there might be pain."

(R. 302)
Dr. Clegg then testified that there was a slight limitation of 1notion due to some p~artial fibrous irregularity
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in the left thumb. ( R. 305) On cross-examination, Dr.
Clegg stated that he couldn't see any other fracture in
the vertebra itself, except the chip fracture and that
was indicated by Exhibit C, where there is an area of
bony roughness with a line through it that may possibly
be a chip fracture. He stated that a healed chip fracture ordinarily would not result in any stiffness or limitation of motion from the bony changes. (R. 306) Thf~
doctor then testified as follows, at the bottorn of page
307:

"Q. And how, Doctor, then, do you conclude
that-how can you determine whether there is or
is not anything wrong with the fibrous tissue in
the neck~
A. The fact that there is limitation of motion in the neck infers that there is something
wrong or pathological of the soft tissue, which
includes the fibrous tissues about the neck.

Q. But, you wou.ldn 't know, from your examination as to specifically, anything specific,
which would be wrong in the neck~
A.
could.

Q.

Well, yes, I think you could say you
What would that

he~

A. When there is limitation of motion, it
is usually due to what we call contracture or scarring of the soft tissues which prevents the motion.
Q. But, just where and what tissue are
damaged, you wouldn't know that~
A. That's right.
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Q. And in basing any opinion as to what
n1ight or n1ight not be damaged in there, you have
to be governed pretty largely by what Mr. Mitchell tells you ho'v he feels and how he can turn
his neck and so on 'f
A. ...-\.s to the an1ount of pain, we depend on
the patient's subjective statement.

Q. Your opinion is pretty largely based
upon subjective statements of the patient as to
what he says is troubling him~
A.

Only partially.

Q.

Partially~

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

What else could your opinion be based

upon~

A. The fact that there is limitation of motion is an objective or definite finding.

Q. How do you determine objectively, Doctor, that there is limitation of motion~
A. We do the test which is to evaluate or
show the amount of motion of the neck, and this
showed limitation of motion.

Q.
if

How do you do that, or what do you do,

anything~

A. First, have the patient turn his head each
way, and then forward and backward while we
hold the soft tissues in our hands; then we actively, or we passively rather, turn the head ourselves
'vhile we feel the neck.
Q. Can you ·determine, while you are doing
that, whether the patient is moving the head to
the full extent he can, orSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A.

I think so.

Q. That is pretty largely subjective again,
however, is it not~
A.

Not necessarily.

Q. And tissues and fibrous tissue in the
neck, Doctor, tends to repair itself, does it not!
A. There is general improvement, but there
may be permanent limitation.

Q.

There may be?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q. Whether there is going to be permanent
limitation is a particular case is a matter of speculation, is it not, Doctor~
A.

Yes, sir; yes, sir.

Q.

Just pure

A.

Well, we don't term it that." (R. 309)

quesswork~

Q. Now, assuming that the injuries to the
jaw are of the extent indicated by the x-ray which
you examined, taken by Dr. Broadbent, andQ. -and, assuming that the patient, more
than a year after the occurrence of th·e accident,
still suffers from this ankylosis of the jaw that
you had yourself observed, would you expect him
to he among the group of those many people who
made a full recovery from an injury of this kind'
1

A. Answer is no, he would not be in the
group that would make a full recovery.

Q. Now, Doctor, assuming that Mr. Mitchell,
more than a year after the injury occurred, continues to suffer from the limitation of motion in
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the neck and the movement of the head that you
have observed and tested at this time, the injury having occurred on the third of April, 1947,
\Vould you expect him to be in that group of people \Yho would make a complete recovery from
the injury to the soft tissues of the neck that you
testified in your cross examination Y
A.

No. (R. 314)
*

:t:

*

*

Doctor, in response to counsel's question
that your appraisal of the condition of Mr. Mitchell may be speculative, did you mean by that
that it \vas pure guesswork, or whether or not
your appraisal is based upon facts which you
have observed~

Q.

. A..

It is based on experience.

Q. And by ''speculation,'' did you intend
to convey the impression that it was pure guesswork as to what the prognosis .would be~
A. I don't think it is guesswo;rk, no, sir."
(R. 315)
\Ve again quote the doctor's testimony fron1 page
311 at the bottom :
'' Q. And whether or not there be any-you
couldn't state for any certainty as to whether or
not-well, I believe you stated, Doctor, there
might be some permanent loss of motion there,
that there might be~
A. If I said, ''might,'' I should have said
stronger; I don't think there is much que·stion
about it, there will be some limitation; you can't
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say a hundred per cent sure, but I don't think
there is much question about it.

Q. And the extent of that disability would
be a matter of pure speeulation, however,
wouldn't it~
A.

Yes, there is always variations.

Q. And sometimes with an injury of that
kind, or usually, the patient is restored to the
substantial use of his jaws, is he not, and mouth~
A.

Sometin1es, yes.

Q.

For all practical purposes?

A. I'd put it it's possibility, hut very rernote in this case.

Q. W ou1d it he your opinion, D'Octor, mHn
of Mr. Mitchell's condition would be able to sing~
A.

I don't know if he could sing before, or

not.

Q. \V ell, assun1ing that he could; assuming
that he could.
A. \V ell, I can't say if you need full range
of his jaw to sing or not." (R. 312)

Q. Dr. Clegg, you have testified that in many
instances persons who suffer fractures to the jaw
make a full and a complete recovery, is that correct'
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. Now, normally, what period of tin1e is
required for that complete recovery to be indicated~

A.

The length of recovery period depends
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on the extensiveness of the injury, the patient's
general condition, the age, and other influencing
factors. It is very variable.
DR. \.\'ILS.ON~ the radiologist \vho testified on behalf of the defendants and 'vho was unable to discover
a fracture in the plaintiff~s cervical vertebrae, nevertheless admitted that there "\vas a possibility that there
might be a fracture there (R. 492); and he further adInitted that even radiologists or roentgenologists disagree in the interpretation of x-ray films and that s.ome
-will see fractures \Yhere others 'vill not see them, and
that in his own experience he has had occasion where he
has disagreed \vith other radiologists in the interpretation of x-ray pictures. (R. 493)
DR. RICHARDS, \Vho testified on behalf of the defendants admitted that there may be a permanent injury in plaintiff's neck. (R. 525) He testified that th·e
union of the ja\v was a poor union as disclosed by the
x-rays he had taken July 1, 1947 after the "\vires had
been removed from plaintiff's jaw.

'' Q. vVill you state what fractures of the
jaw are indicated and what the type of fracture,
is that the x-ray pictures discloses~
A. It was merely a small linear fracture
at that point. I think m·ost of you can see this
small line through the right side of the jaw, and
back in the back part of the jaw on the left side
there is a complete fracture line which is rep·resented by this dark line running through at this
point.
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Q.

Wha,t do you mean by complete fracture~

A. Well, I mean it is complete in so far as
the bones themselves, completely broken through
and apparently somewhat separated.

Q. Would you refer to that as a comminuted
fracture?
A.

Yes.

Q. State whether or not there has been a
satisfactory union of the jaw at that point.
A. Well, in this x-ray there is definitely not
a satisfactory union, in my interpretation.

Q. Your interpretation is that the union of
the jaw at that point is a poor union?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. And this x-ray was taken after the wires,
of course, were removed from the jaw?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What date in July, doctor?

A. The date there is just obscure. It was
taken on the first day of July, 1947. (R. 527-8)
The witness was then shown Plaintiff's Exhibit Z
and testified with respect to that exhibit as follows, commencing at page 528 of the record :
Will you state what deformities this
exhibit shows with respect to the jaw?
'' Q.

A. Well, this x-ray shows the san1e fracture
through the left side of the jaw at the so-called
angle, or at this point. This x-ray shows that
there is some beginning union in the posterior
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portion \Y hieh 'vould produce a reasonable stability of the jaw.
Q.

But 'vhere the shado'v is it discloses a

poor union 'f

A.

1"9" es, sir.

Dr. Richards diagnosed a fracture of the metacarpal
bones of plaintiff's left hand (R. 531) Then with respect
to the injury to plain tiff's nose, Dr. Richards testified
as follo,vs, beginning on page 532:

· ~ Q. N o,v, doctor, at that time you also made
an examination of the plaintiff's nose, did you
not~

A.

Yes, sir.

Did you discover any abnormalities
about his nose~
Q.

A.

Yes, he had a fractured nose.

What was the extent of that fracture
and the details with respect to it, doctor~
Q.

A. As I recall he had definite external evidence of a fracture as well as internal evidence
of a fratcure, with somewhat of an encroachment
of one of his nasal passages.
~as it then
nasal septum~

Q.

the

A.

what we call a deviation of

Yes.

Q. Is that the cartilaginous structure in the
nose, or bony structure~
A. The cartilage follows the bony structure.
It may have a fracture of its own, but as a rule
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it follows the bony structure which supports it.
Q. Did you determine a fracture in the bony
structure of the nose which resulted in external
and internal deformity~

A.

That was my opinion, yes.
Q. You observed there was some intrusion
into the nasal passage which would obstruct
breathing to a certain extent~
A. Yes, sir; I have so stated, that there was
obstruction, some obstruction.''
At the time of his examination of the plaintiff, Dr.
Richards also observed that there was a point of anasthesia in the vicinity of the left lip and that plaintiff
was in a highly nervous condition as a result of the injuries he had sustained (R. 534)
DR. vV. LES WARBURTON, a dentist, testified on
behalf of plaintiff that he examined plaintiff's mouth on
J·uly 22 and referred him for some extractions. In describing the condition of plaintiff's mouth at that time
the doctor testified as follows, beginning at page 370:
A. Well, his mouth had pretty well healed
from the injury at the time I saw him. There
were still two broken roots imbedded in the mouth
and which the crowns had been broken off, and
one of them had almost completely healed over,
but the mouth was, in general, was in the healing process, almost complete, and, at that time,
we felt it was most urgent, in order to get his
mouth healthy, to refer him for some immediate
extractions, and, later on, come hack and have all
the balance of the upper teeth e-xtracted, because
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be in1possible to build on the re1naining teeth for
any restoration.
Q. N o,v, \vhat nu1nber of teeth, if any, had
the appearance of having been shattered in the
upper ja \V J?
"\V. ell, that is hard for me to remember
right no,v. \\T e can refer to the x-rays and tell
you 1nore definitely because that's the record of
the mouth. I have got a cast here -of his front
teeth; "\Ve could not get his mouth open wide
enough to make a cast of his mouth at the time,
and 'Ye couldn't make an impression of his mouth
at any time until all the upper teeth were extracted except just the anterior teeth.
-t\._.

Q. I hand you Exhibit D, which purports
to be the x-ray pictures to whieh you have referred.
A. And from these pictures, there wa.s one
tooth that was completely knocked out of the
mouth at the time of the accident; you can see it
because the bone is so injured.

Q.

Which tooth was

that~

A. That "\vould be the upper right second
bicuspid. The first bicuspid, the whole crown is
completely broken off, the root retained. The
cuspid was splintered, and I have got a record of
that tooth here on this cast where it was broken
off and chipped there around the crown and in
different directions; thenQ. At this point, doctor, were those fractures such as to expose the nerve~

A. Not on the cuspid, but on the other two
teeth, on the lateral and the first bicuspid.
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In your experience, would that condition
have a tendency to produce a great deal of pain
until the situation was remedied~
Q.

A.

Definitely, until you get denture relief.

Q.

Now, proceed, doctor.

A. Right lateral, which is the one next to
the cuspid, was completely broken off, and that
is the one I saw was imbedded and healed over,
and only by the·x-ray, we could see definitely there
was a root, although I remember having suspicions of being some infection or inflammation
there.
Doctor, you have reference to this imbedding and of the roots remaining; is it necessary in the p·roper treatment of the mouth to
extract those roots~
Q.

A. Oh, definitely; all roots have to be removed to make certain you remove infection.
Q.

Now, proceed, doctor.

A. In that case, then-now, I can't remember how far the molars were involved in the balance of the mouth, I remember one tooth on the
left side was splintered, but with the locking of
the jaw, he had lack of opening, a semi-ankylosis
there was at the time I was treating him, be impossible to get an impression to make a bridge;
if there were any remaining teeth, it was only by
removing enough teeth, we were able to make
him a restoration to get into his mouth to make
any impression.''
With respect to the injury to teeth in the lower jaw,
Dr. Warburton testified as follows, on page 373:
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...:\. The lo,ver right. We sent him home
alhnYing that pa1·t of his n1outh to heal up. He was
coming back for complete upper extractions and
the removal of lower left second molar, which was
badly splintered from the accident; that wa.s so
splintered down the side of the tooth, and the
'vhole buckle surface destroyed, that had to come
out. That was right in line of the fracture of the
jaw, too, so x-rays will show that was involved
in the line of fracture, and was possibly retarding
the healing of the fracture.
Q. That particular fracture there would
have a tendency to produce a great deal of pain
until it 'vas corrected, wouldn't it, doctor~

·A. Oh, definitely, especially when the tooth
is right in the line of fracture.
Q.
applyu?

Then thereafter what treatment did you

A. On Septen1ber 12, he had all the remaining upper teeth out, and that low·er molar kept
hun in town for a few days to check the preliminary healing, and sent him home, and I ·didn't see
him again until Octover 7, and I proceeded to
make him his first denture, which is more or less
a temporary denture, in my estimation, and it was
only at that time we were able to get an impression tray in his mouth to get an impression, and
it was at that time I started my examination of
the lower teeth, clean them out; we find out we
have got another tooth on the lower that is badly
splintered, the lower right cuspid.
Q. That in addition to the one that is in
the fracture area~

.A.

Yes, lower right cuspid back of the
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mouth that is badly splintered and will need restoring in sorne way.
He then testified to the future treatment that would
be necessary in order to repair the injured teeth in the
lower jaw and in order to install another denture in the
upper jaw. (R. 376-377) The doctor testified that the
gums in the lower jaw were very healthy. (R. 378) Dr.
Warburton agreed with Dr. Dedekind that there was
pyorrhea on the right lower n1olar, but did not see how
pyorrhea could be demonstrated on the left molar in
the lower jaw because it was right in the line of fracture. (R. 379) On cross examination Dr. Warburton
testified as follows on page 382:
'' Q. Now, let's-if you assume, doctor, that
Mr. :Thlitchell had not been injured in an accident,.
would you have any opinion as to whether, later
on, during his lifetime, he would in all probability
have to have substantial work done~

A. I couldn't make a complete examination
of those upper teeth, and those are the teeth that
are a loss. We can't prove anything on that
question; go back to the lower teeth, if I can keep
him as a patient, I would almost guarantee he
could keep his lower teeth the rest of his life,
remaining lower teeth.
Q. After he expends this amount of money
here that you mentioned, you would expect to put
his mouth and teeth in pretty good condition~
A.

P·retty good condition.

Q.

He would have the substantial use of his

mouth~
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...\. The only handicap that he has g·ot is that
he can't open his 1nouth wide enough to really
get "'"hat you call a substantial use because he
can't take large 1nouthsful of anything.
Then on redirect examination at page 383 the doctor testified as follows:

'· Q. Of course, doctor, whatever remedial
steps are taken by way of substitution of a plate,
they never are as satisfactory as the original
teeth, are they)?
. .A.. \V- ell, never. They consider a denture is
about twenty per cent efficient, as far as masticator~~ pressure, and people can learn to use those
dentures and get by and do the job, but, if they
haYe their o"'\vn natural teeth, they ought to be
able to do about five times better.

Dr.

\~Varburton

then testified on page 375, as follows:

Q. Did the teeth, except for the shattered
appearance, appear to be sound~
A--\. _Hardly kno'v how to answer that, be-

cause there \Vas so much displacement on some
of the teeth there in his mouth, due to fracture
that he had a misplacement, when he was through,
the injured teeth were loosened and in changed
and ne'v position; they would heal in that position. I don't think I would say they were in a
natural position~ any tooth in the upper jaw, althought I won't say positively.

Q. What I mean, did the teeth appear to
haYe caries .or cavities, or other conditions which
rendered them unsound except for the condition
causecl

h~'

the

injury~
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A. He had some restorative work in his
upper teeth, but I would say they were sound with
that.
Now, doctor, you say that you later, after
the extractions had been completed, made an impression for the purpose of making a complete
upper plate~
Q.

A.

Yes.

Q.

And, thereafter, did you perform that

work~

A. I inserted a full upper denture on Octoher 14.
Q. Now, have you made an examination
since to determine whether or not it will be necessary to make any further alterations in that upper
denture~

A. Well, that upper denture, in my estimation, is a temporary denture. I would like to have
him in and make a denture, now that his mouth is
completely healed; we can't ever say a mouth is
completely healed.
Q. Why was it necessary to n1ake a temporary denture~

A. Wouldn't want him to go six months
without teeth.
Q. So that denture which was made, you
considered to be a tem·porary one~

A. Yes, I made it-well, on the basis that
we would, after he got more of an opening, we
could do a better job by getting in his mouth.and
making proper impressions.
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BRIEF OF ARGUMENT
Point 1. The tria.Z oourt did not e.rr in
adnl'itting i·n evidence the A·wnuif·y Table (Exhibit
X) a.nd in i.ts inst~rnctions theteon.

TheTe zcas a.1nple er1"dence of permanent inJury and of pernurne-nt in~pai.rment of e~arn
ing capacity.
(b) The annuity table W as iJn p1iOtper form ..
(c) The co1.trf 's instructions on the A'Yiffi!Uity
Table zcere in all .respects p·~o·per and if defend. .
(lffl;ts desired ·amplificatlion ~of ~t·he couTt's charge,
they should have requested it.
Point 2. The court did not err in it's other
instructi.ons to the jury, except t.o the p·rejwdice :af
the pZainti_-f!.
(a) Evidence of defen~a;nts' negli.genoe was
clea-r, convimcing amd wncont'l1a~ic:tied.
(b) There was no substantial evidence of
contrib.uto.ry negligence which warranted submission of that defense t.o the jwry.
(c) Assuming the suffici.ency of the evidence of contributory negligence, the court nevertheless fully submitted ·and .over-emp·ha~ized such
defense to the jury.
Point 3. The defendJ(JJYbts did not p'11ovperly
except to the instructions they now complain of
and oarnnot urge such exceptions on a.pp1eal.
(a)

1

Point 4. The court did not err in its failure to give defendants' ,requested instructions.
Poilnt 5. The court dJid not err im denying
defend{},tnts' mo1tion for ·a new tr~al.
Point 1. The trial court ·did not err in .admitting in evidence the An711Uity Table (Exhibit
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X) (]fltd

vn

its !instructions thereon.
(a,) There w,a.s ample evidence of p~erman
ent injury ·and. of permanent im.p~airm.evnt of earning oap~ac~ty.

Defendants' exceptions to the use of the annuity
table (Exhibit X) )s based upon their unwarranted as ..
sumption that the plaintiff failed to show permanent
injury impairing his earning· capacity. It is for this reason that plaintiff has set out with admitted fullness the
Inedical and lay testimony showing that defendants'
position in that respect is not justified by the evidence.
To sumn1arize briefly, the plaintiff at the time of
the trial (more than a year after the accident) still complained of a restriction in the movement of the neck in
all spheres of motion; that he cou1d move it to the extent
he demonstrated to the jury but beyond that it was very
painful. It is ohvious that this injury would seriously
ha1nper plaintiff in the performance of his work as a
rancher, farmer, and teacher. He stated that there were
a good many things he couldn't do on the farm. He
couldn't do strenuous physical work well (and it cannot
be denied that a farn1er's work is strenuous); that he
'vas unable to pitch hay without pain; that he has a
definite feeling of pain when he attempts to lift any
heavy object; that he can't sow his crop·s; that he can''t
plo'v a field satisfactorily, drill grain or things like that,
because he can't watch to see what is happening; that
in connection with his ranching activities it is necessary
for hin1 to ride horseback, but he rides trusty horses
usually at a walk, because of the pain caused by the
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jarring; that he hns baeked his auton1obile into a ditch
a fe\Y tiines because he had difficulty in reversing the
car: that for the past fe,v months there has been no
inlproYement in the condition of his neck.

In addition to the neck condition with its continuIng S)11lptonls, plaintiff testified that he was restricted
in the n1oYe1uent of his jaw; that in the region of the
upper ja"r close to his left ear there was always some
pain; that there \vas an ugly sensation in the move·ment
of the jaw so that \vhen he tries to us·e it in talking or
eating, it feels sort of artificial and it's quite difficult
for hin1 to use it.
\\Te earnestly urge that the persisting restriction

in the use of the ja'v adversely limits plaintiff's ability
to perform his work as a teacher. How defendants find
it possible to arrive at any other conclusion escap,es us.
Defendants' position might he more tenable if plaintiff
\vas a librarian with the duty of furnishing books to
readers in silenee, but it goes without saying that unimpaired speaking po\vers are essential to the school
teacher.
),foreover, plaintiff testified that he still has extreme
difficulty in getting rest and that he can only sleep in
certain positions; that his breathing through the nose
gives him difficulty; that his head aches continually
across the base of his l1ead; that he suffers considerable
pain in the area of his injured ear; that his ear feels
like it is tied up; that the discomfort which resulted
from the spraining and fracturing of his hands still
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continues.
The permanency of plaintiff's injuries were confirmed by the m·edical testimony, particularly that of
Dr. Butler and Dr. Clegg.
Dr. Butler diagnose·d a skull fracture and a fracture
on the body of the first cervical vertebr ae and a change
in the consistency of the tissue involving the first and
second cervical vertebrae ; that such -condi'tions wouid
very definitely limit motion of the neck because the first
two vertebrae of the neck support the atlas and axis; that
there were exte~rnal indications of p~ain on deep p~ressure
in ·and around the neek. That the injury to th·e neck would
naturally result in some disability which would be of
permanent nature, and the patient's use of his neck and
1novement of his head would be restricted permanently In
all spheres of motion; that the process of calcification
or deposit of bone in the vicinity of the first cervical
vertebrae in similar cases of severe injury involving a
joint of the vertebrae very frequently result in traumatic
arthritis or an arthritic condi~tion of the intervertebral
joint or articulation; that the injury to the neck would
have a tendency to caus·e pain upon a movement of the
head. That the condition of the neck would of necessity
be due to a s·evere injury or blow and could not result
from natural causes; that plaintiff has suffered a perInanent partial loss of bodily fun-ction; that there will
probably be early fatigue and a tendency toward traumatic neurosis- and possibly post traumatic esthenia.
That the first cervical vertebra is fractured into the joint.
1
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\\'"ith respeet to the ja\v injury, Dr. Butler testified that
there \Vas a possibility that plaintiff would develop
arthritis in the artieulation of the ja\v on both sides.
Dr. Reed Clegg testified that his examination of the
plaintiff on January 15, 1948, disclosed moderate limitation of the motion of the head and neck in all directions,
and further a fracture of the nose with deviation of
the nasal septum 'to the left and ankylosis, partial
fibrous slight of the left thwnb an,d l'astly ankylosis
partial fibrous of the jaw joint or a restriction of motion
in the lo,ver jaw. Dr. Clegg upon being shown exhibit
· · C '' diagnosed an abnormal bony prominence in the
area of the first cervical vertebrae which may he the
result of a chip fracture. The only significant change
'vhich Dr. Clegg observed on the second examination of
plaintiff was some imp,rovement in the motion of the
left hand. Otherwise, plaintiff's condition remained the
same. Dr. Clegg testified that there would be some permanent limitation of motion of plaintiff's jaw and neck.
Dr. Clegg 'vas able to determine by the movement of
the patient's head with his hands that there was limitation of motion; that there were indications of something
wrong with the soft tissues including the fibrous tissues
about the neck; that condition usually is due to contracture or scarring of the soft tissues which prevents
n1otion; that he could not say 100% sure, but he did
not think that there was much question but what there
would be some permanent loss of motion in plaintiff's
neck.
Both of the dentists who treated plaintiff· observed
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a restriction in the plaintiff's ability to open his mouth.
Dr. Warburton testified that this was of sufficient extent to make it impossible for him to take an impression
of plaintiff's mouth until all the upper teeth were extracted except the anterior teeth. (R. 372, 374) Dr. Dedekind experienc-ed difficulty in inserting the x-ray plat·es.
(R. 186-7) Of course, both dentists established the necessity of complete removal of all of plaintiff's upper teeth
as a result of the accident, and Dr. Warburton indicated
need for considerable further treatment including the
preparation of a more permanent upper plate and the
repair of teeth in the low·er jaw damaged by the accident. Dr. 'Varburton testified that artificial teeth are
only one fifth as efficient for masticatory purposes as
natural teeth. (R. 224)
It is true that Dr. '~Tilson, the radiologist called on
behalf of the defendants was unable to discover a fractur,e in the plaintiff's neck, but he, nevertheless, admitted
that there was a p·ossibility that a fracture might be
there, and he further adrnitted that even radiologists
disagree in the interp-retation of x-ray film and that some
will see fractures where some will not see th·em and that
has been true in his own experience.
Dr. Richards testified to a poor bony union with
respect to the compound fracture of the jav{ as indicated
by x-ray taken July 1, 1947. He further testified that he
had diagnosed a fracture of the bones of plaintiff's left
hand and fracture of plaintiff's nose with encroachment
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tiff·s hig-hly nervous eondition as a result of the injuries
he had sustained.
Fro1n the foregoing 1nedical testiinony we deem the
conclusion irresistible that plaintiff suffered permanent
disabling injuries to his neck and javv which vvould of
necessity impair his ability to earn his livelihood either
as a teacher, rancher or farmer.
Plaintiff \Vas 51 years of age (R. 316) and had 20
and 20/100 years of life expectancy. (Exhibit X) That
his previous year's income from the school district as
p1·incipal in 1924 was approximately $5100.00. (R. 329)
and for the year prior it was slightly less than $4800.00
(R. 330) and his salary in 1942 vvas around $3500.00.
(R. 331)
\Vhen asked why he would not be able to handle his
~chool work at the present time _the plaintiff stated:
•'Answer : Well, in the first place, I would
simply give out. It tires me terribly to sit here in
the court room. I do not think I would do that,
and the neck and javv handicap I think would make
it quite imp·ossihle for me to do a reasonably good
job in the school."
. .\lthough plaintiff had terminated his connections
\Vith the schools in Arizona, he stated that he intended to
eon1e to Parowan vvhere his farm and ranch property
is and to get that into condition so that it would oper(~te properly, and then if conditions arose permitting he
expected to continue his school work. (R. 360)
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In describing his ranch and farm property, the plaintiff stated that he had about 98 acres of land which he
irrigated, that he had pastures in the valley and privately owned winter grazing in the north end of the
valley and approximately 1400 acres of summer grazing
1nountain land near Parowan, that in connection with
those lands, he ran she-ep and cattle. (R. 333)
\Ve submit that plaintiff's evidence is altogether sufficient to place this case squarely under the rule established by this court in the case of Pauley v. McCarthy,
109 Utah 431, 184 Pac. 2d. 123, wherein the court made
the follovving declaration:
"We wish to make it clear that we do not
hold that in every case where permanent injuries are alleged and evidence in support thereof
is introduced that the mortality and annuity tables are admissible. We go only so far as to
hold that where the injury alleged and proved is
pern1anent and is of such a nature as to indicate
a permanent m~terial impairment of a substantial
nature in the earning capacity of the plaintiff, the
mortality and annuity tables are ··admissible.''
This rule was reasserted by this court in the .very
recent case of George G. Schlatter vs. Wilson McCarthy,
196 Pac. 2nd 968, fro1n 'vhich opinion we quote quite
extensively as follows:
''There can be no doubt in this case that
plaintiff sustained very serious personal injuries, and that such injuries will to some extent
be permanent in nature. The real question iR
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'vhether the evidence adduced at. the trial would
support a finding that the injuries were 'of such
nature as to indicate a pern1anent n1aterial inlpairment of a substantial nature in the earning
capacity of the plaintiff.' The question is not
without difficulty. The medical testimony, standing alone, probably would not support the finding.
But after a careful consideration of the entire
record, we have reached the conclusion that a
jury, from the medical testimony taken together
'vith the other evidence in the case, and particularly the testimony of p~laintiff, and viewing it
in the light of their knowledge and experience in
life, could justifiably have found that plaintiff
suffered a permanent and substantial impairment
of earning capacity. And since the evidence would
authorize that finding, the trial court did not err
in admitting exhibit D in evidence.
"The accident occurred on October 9, 1945,
and the trial of this action took p:lace some thirteen months later.
"Plaintiff's right leg was fractured in two
places between the knee and the ankle. For about
the first seven months after the injury plaintiff
was treated hy doctors retained by defendants
and during this period little progress was made
in the healing ·of the injury. Thereafter, plaintiff
was treated by Dr. Clegg, an orthopedist of his
own cho9sing.
"Dr. Clegg testified that when plaintiff came
to him the upper fracture had healed with a bony
union, but with mal-alignment; the lower fracture
showed no evidence of bony union and osteomyelitis and pus drainage were present in that are·a.
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erly aligned and set in position. At the time of
trial the osteomyelitis was quiescent, and apparently healed, but bony union was incomplete. The
· doctor planned to graft bone chips from plaintiff's pelvic region across the fracture site. Physiotherapy treatments would also be required.
''The doctor anticipated that the proposed
operation would be successful, but even if the
best possible results were achieved, plaintiff
would have ~at least a ten per cent permanent dis-ability to his right leg, including muscle weakness,
limitation of movements of the joints in the right
knee and ankle, and poor postural balance. Plaintiff would not be able to return to work as a locomotive engineer until about two and a half years
after trial, or three and a half years after the
accident. There was a possibility that recovery
might be delayed and he substantially less complete if the osteomyelitis recurred, or if there was
other infection·. And because of plaintiff's age,
recovery might he slow and less complete than
. the· doctor hoped.
' ' The doctor vvas fan1iliar only in a general
way with the duties of a locomotive engineer, but
assuming a successful rec:overy, he anticipated
respondent would be able to handle moderate
work, to walk reasonable distances up to twothirqs of a mil-e, to walk up and down stairs, and
if he exercis-ed care, t:o perform the various duties
of an engineer suggested to him by counsel. ..
"The evidence of plaintiff's ten per cent permanent disability to his left leg, when taken together with the fact that plaintiff would be nearly
· 65 years of age before he would be able to return
to work, and the generally recognized reluctance
of employers· and especially ·railroads to engage
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the 8erYices of Inen of advanced years, particularly "rhen physically handicapped, would justify
a jury in finding that plaintiff might never again
be gainfully employed as an engineer or in railroad "'ork for 'Yhich he was trained. It should be
noted here that plaintiff 'vas not trained or qualified to engage in any other gainful occupation.
. .\.nd even if plaintiff were able to return to railroad work, it is fairly inferable that he would not
be able to work so many hours as before, due to
his weakened condition. It is also inferable that
even if plaintiff would be able to return to his
railroad work, that he would not be able to continue in employment for as many years as if he
had not been injured.
''Although the evidence is not as clear and
satisfactory as it might be, we think it is sufficient
to support a finding of p·ermanent impairment of
earning capacity. It was, therefore, in error to
admit in evidence plaintiff's exhibit D, the combined tables.''
See also Lovins vs. City of St. Louis (Mo.), 90 So.
vV. 2nd 430. Borland VS. :racific ~leat and Packing Company, C\Vashington) 279 Pac. 94. The Washington case
applies the rule that the annuity tables are admissible
under the same rules and limitations as mortality tables.
See also Gotsch vs. Market Street Railvvay, (Calif.) 265
Pac. 268. Groat vs. Wa~kup Dr~ayage, et nl (California)
58 Pac. 2d. 200. Woodward vs. Wilbur, (R. I.) 169 Atl.
486. Penley vs. Teague & Harlow Company (:~1aine)
140 Atl. 374.
B.

The Annuity ~able W.as in Prnop·er Form.

The form of annuity tables received in evidence as
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plaintiff's exihibt X was in all respects proper and the
annuity table was fully explained by the witness, Mr.
Wood, the certified public accountant who prep,ared it.
Mr. Wood explained how the life expectancy was arrived
at. (R. 406) He explained the computation of the Exhibit
X (R. 411-412) On cross examination the defens-e counsel developed testimony qualifying the mortality and annuity tables.
The tables were supplemented by ·expert testimony
on the part of the witness Myrick, who testified with
respect to the interest rates available to investors without special skill and training in finan·cial matters that
might he expected on reasonably safe investments. (R.
414-420)
Counsel points out at page 37 of their brief that
the total verdict was $21,594.22 and they assum·e that
in arriving at such verdict the jury arbitrarily selected
the figure $16,591.71 from the 4% column in the 5th
line of Exhibit X providing for $100.00 per month for
the full life exp~ectancy. Of course, ·defendants rely upon
the affidavits of the jurors for their breakdown of the
items constituting the general v-erdict. This court has
repeatedly held that the affidavits of the jury are not
available for that purpose. But in any event the defendants can not complain that the jury used the annuity
tables as it did in arriving at its verdict. Indeed, that is
·precisely the reason for the introduction of the exhibit into evidence. As was pointed ou't in the case· of Schlatter
vs. 'Vilson _~fcCarthy, supra., the· annuity tables:
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'' \Yhen properly used by the jury n1ay be of
greal value in assisting the ju·ry for fixing the

dan1ages for loss of income. The calculation of
the present value ·of the monthly inco1ne over a
period of a life expectaney is no simple mathematieal problem. "\Ve are not aware of any device
other than these tables which \vill accurately infornl the jury as to the matters therein contained.
The jury should not be deprived of the aid and
a~sistance of these tables merely becau8e they are
susceptible of n1is-use. ''
In that case the general verdict was In the exact
amount of $41,212.44 ''Thich corresponded to the figures
on the table opposite the 1nonthly income of $300.00
discounted at 21f2 o/c. The Exhibit X was in the same form
as the exhibit approved in the Schlatter case. On petition for rehearing the court filed an opinion on October
20, 1948, in the Schlatter case from which we quote as
follows:
''Appellant's petition for rehearing on the
grounds that this court failed to decide the contention principally advanced by appellant, that
the verdict was contrary to law because the
jury found that plaintiff was permanently and
totally disabled. Appellants assert that since the
general verdict was in the sun1 of $41,212.44,
w·hich was the present value of $300.00 per 1nonth
discounted at 21/2 % for plaintiff's full life expectancy of 13.47 years, that it must he regarded
as an a'Yard for tot-al and permanent disability,
and that such an a\vard is unsupported by the evidence and contrary to the instructions of the
court, and hence cannot l1e permitted to stand.
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''Although we did not expressly treat this
contention in our opinion, 've thought that it was
implicit therein, that the proposition now relied
upon by petitioners was not meritorious. Upon
re-exarnining our opinion, we find that the implications are not as broad as we assumed them to
he, and so that counsel and the bench and bar
may be more fully apprised of our reasons for
holding petitioner's position to be without merit,
we set forth here the reasons for so ruling.
''The fallacy of their argument is that petitioners assume that the entire amount of the verdict was for loss of earning capacity, and that the
jury made no award for pain and suffering. There
is no basis for such an assumption in view of the
extensive and uncontradicted evidence as to the
pai.n and suffering endured by plaintiff over a
long period of time. We cannot know, and we
are not at liberty to speculate as to what reasoning prompted the ·jury to use the base figure of
$300.00 per month in determining what the award
for general dan1ages should be. We most certainly cannot presume that the jury ignored completely the extensive evidence of pain and suffering, and that it n1ade an a'vard for loss in earning
capacity far in excess of what the evidence showed
the loss in earning capacity to be. We must presume, in the absence of any clear showing to the
contrary, that the jury acted in accordance with
its sworn duty, and that a substantial portion of
the general verdict must be allocated to pain and
suffering.''
For further answer to defendants' contention that
the annuity tables 'vere improperly constituted, we desire to quote from ~the federal ca~e of Southern Pacific
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Company vs. Klinge,

~C. C ....\.

10) ti3 :B,ed. 2d 85 at page

87:
""0 bj ection is 1nade to the tes tiinony of an
actuary who presented annuity tables for the assistance of the jury. These were co1nputed for
the expectancy of the plaintiff, and the figure
$2,400 was used as a base. The table gave the
present sum necessary to return $2,400 a year
for the expectancy, at various percentages ranging from two to eight per cent. After the jury
found the annual imp1airment of earning power resulting from the loss of the arm, and the rate of
interest which collld reasonably he expected from
safe investn1ents, a sin1ple computation applied to
the table would bring them to a correct verdict.
Con1plaint is made because $2,400 was used as a
base figure, the contention being that the loss of
the arm did not in1pair the earnings to that extent. Some figure had to be used; whether it was
$100, or $1,000, or $10,000 does not affect the correctness of the table·. Whatever figure was used,
the jury must first find the loss of earning power
and then use the table. The same objection could
be made to any tables of interest or annuity calculations, unless perchance the base used by the
table hap.pened to be the amount in suit. The
size of the verdict indicates the jury was not
misled. Figured on a four per cent return, which
a jury might fairly find to be all that could reasonably be expected from safe investments, the
. verdict is based on a loss of earning power of
about $1,500 a year. This assignm~ent is entirely
without merit."

C.

The court's 1·rnstructions on the Annuity Table
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were in all respects proper and if defendants desi:red
a,mplifioation of the oou,rt's charge) they should have re-

qu·est,ed 'it.
The defendants conrplain of the court's giving its
instruction No. 22 in which the jury were told that the
total loss of futur;e ea.rnings if any must be reduced or
discounted on the basis of a fair rate of interest or return. If the eourt had failed to give such instruction, the
defendants "\vould have some cause of complaint. It
reprresented a proper charge and furnished the jury with
the necessary guide for the computation of their verdict.
The instruction would naturally have the eff·ect of reducing rather than increasing the verdict.
The defendants further complain that the court
gave no qualifying instruetions to th·e jury relative to the
use of plaintiff's life expectancy as indicated by the
evidence. In its instruction No. 17 the court told· the
jury that the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for the
actual loss of past earnings, if any, and for any impairment of earning capacity,.if any, which will diminish his
capacity to earn money in the future, and considering
that matter the jury may take into consideration the
degree and character of the loss or imp~airment of earning capacity, if any, resulting from plaintiff's injuries
and the length of time it would continue. Moreover instruction No. 22 im'pOS'es the qualification heretofore
indicated again in instruction No. 22-A given at the request of the defendants and rep·resenting a restatement
of their requested instruction No. 20, the court s-et forth
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the c.onditions under \vhirh the plaintiff would be ·entitled to use the annuity tables. In that instruction the
jury \Yere told that the annuity tables were no evidence
or indication in or of then1selves that the plaintiff has
sustained any permanent loss of earning capacity, nor
are such tables evidence that plaintiff has sustained any
particular a1nount of permanent loss to his earning capacity, nor is evidence that plaintiff Inay have sustained
son1e permanent injury sufficient to prove that he has
sustained any permanent partial impairment of a substantial nature to his earning capacity, and the jury
were told that unless the plaintiff has proven by preponderance, or greater weight of the evidence, that
plaintiff has sustained a permanent material impairment
of a substantial nature to his earning capacity, then
they \Yere instructed to entirely disregard the annuity
tables. Furthermore, counsel went into the matter fully
on cross-examination and placed before the jury, testiInony to the effect that all people do not live to their
full expectancy, but some die much earlier and that there
is no guarantee that a person is going to have good
health, and there is a possibility that he might meet with
future accident. (R. 412) Counsel at th.e trial were apparently satisfied with the state of the evidence with
respect to the limitations to be placed on the annuity
table, for they requested no instructions relating to
the use of annuity tables exeept in their request No. 20
\vhich \vas given in full in instruction No. 22-A.
J t "\Vill be noted that the only request made by the
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nui ty tables "\\7 a.s their request No. 20 which was granted
in toto. It is ele1nentary that a party may not complain
of the failure of the court to amplify its charge when
the complaining party n1ade no request at the trial for
such amplification. In that connectiop. we c.all the court's
attention to the case of James vs. Chicago, St. Paul, and
~f & 0 Railroad Company, (Minn.) 16 N.W. 2d. 188 at
page 192 from 'vhich we quote as follows:
''There were some inaccuracies in the trial
court's instructions of which defendant also complains. These were not specifically called to the
court's attention after the charge was given,
and in our opinion could not have affected the
result. They will therefore be disregarded. Merit
v. Stuve, 815 Minn. 44, Northwest 2nd, 329.
''In this category is an instruction by which
the court told the jury: . . . Estimated future
darnages .... you have to give its present value
of the future earnings .... in other words money
earned in the future would not be worth as much
at the present tin1e, but that is a matter of interest.
''Counsel was apparently satisfied with the
instruction as gi.ven, he asked no further elaboration, and took no further exception. Defendant
was therefore held to be in no position to complain.''
To the sa1ne effect is the case of Ralph vs. 1\Iacniarr
Stores, ( 1\{ontana) 62 I:>ac. 2d. 1285:
~'The

next question raised has to do with the
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tality table to ~hO\\T the expectancy of plaintiff's
life. In admitting it the court said: ·This is a
matter that is generally taken up in connection
with instructions.' The court also stated that
"the preferred table is admitted in evidence, subject to instructions to be given to the jury, the
expec.taney of life of a female of the age of 34
years is 32.42 years.' Defendants now complain
tha.t no instructions regarding this matter were
later given to the jury. They contend that the
court, after admitting the table in evidence,
should have instructed the jury as to the applicability of the annuity tables; and that where,
as in this case, the evidence is conflicting as to
whether the plaintiff's injuries are permanent the
court should have instructed th·e jury that such
tables were not to be used unless the injuries were
found to be permanent, citing Cornell vs. Great
Northern Ry. Co., 57 Mont. 177, 187 P. 902, and
Robinson v. Helena Light & Ry. Co., 38 Mont. 222,
99 P. 837. Thus defendants contend that the adInission of the mortality tables in evidence was
error in view of the fact that the necessary qualifying instructions with reference thereto weTe
not subsequently given.
''Under the authority of the case of Stephens
v. Elliott, 36 Mont. 92, 92P. 45, the mortality table
in question was properly admitted in evidence.
It may be true, as defendants contend, that the
instructions should have been given qualifying
the extent of consideration to be given to that
table. However, this court has held that a district court may not be put in error for failure to
instruct the jury on a given point on its own motion; that if appellant desired an instruction on
a subject not covered by the instructions given
(such as lirni ting the effect of evidence admitted
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over objection to a certain purpose), it was his
duty to tender it. State v. Miller, 97 Mont. 434,
34 P. (2d) 979; Bourke v. Butte, etc. Power Co.,
33 Mont. 267, 83 P. 470. It was defendants' duty
to offer the instructions which they elaim should
have been given. Having neglected to do so, they
cannot now put the court in error for failure to
give such instructions.''
We also quote from Newman vs. Campbell, ( C~al.)
73 Pac. 2d. 1265, 1266 as follows:
"As stated, the court instructed as to plaintiff's life expectancy, and that the jury might
take this into consideration in determining her
damage, if any. It is urged that she was not in
normal health at the time of her injury, and that
consequently the instruction was improper. On
this question also the evidence was conflicting, and
the jury might have found that the plaintiff was
for a pe-rson of her age in ordinary health. The
mortality table was admissible, and, although
not conclusive, was evidence of the probable duration of her life. Under the evidence she was entitled to an instruction based upon he-r theory
of the eas·e. Groat v. Walkup Drayage, etc. Co.,
14 Cal. App. 2d. 350, 58 P. 2d 200; Morrow v.
M:endleson, 15 Cal. App. 2d 15, 58 P. 2d 1302·.
If the appellant desired an instruction explaining
in more detail the weight to he given the elements
fixing her life expectancy, as was the case in
Groat v. Walkup Drayage, etc. Co., supra, such
an instruction should h-ave been offered. This was
not done, and in the -circumstances appellant has
no ground for complaint. Murphy v. National
Ice Cream Co., 114 Cal. App. 482, 300 P. 91.
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Point 2. The court did ~not err in its .other instructious to the .iury, e.1.:cept to the pre)tt;di.ce of the p,za,ilntiff.

Evidence of defe'nd.ants' ~negligence was
clea.r, con-r'incz~ng and ~l!ncont'rtadicted .
(a)

. A. s appears from the rather full resume of the evi-

ence under the state1nent of facts, the evidence was undisputed that the defendants atten1pted to pass another vehicle in a dust stor1n under circumstances which rendered visibility poor, and that for that purpose defendants operated their truck and trailer on the plaintiff's
side of the road, 'vithout- assuring themselves sufficient
time within '\Vhich to complete the passage and return
to their right hand side •of the road. They attempted
~uch passage when plaintiff 'vas approaching from the
o_pposite direction 'vi thou t seeing plain tiff's vehicle in
tim·e to avoid the collision whieh nccurred on the extreme
east side of the road. In ~attempting to pass the defendants achieved a speed of approximately 20 miles per
hour, while other vehicles in the dust storm were holding
speed to a lesser amount or in the act of stopping. They
attempted to pass another vehicle which was lengthened
by the presence of a boat trailer on the back and the
defendant's vehicle was itself about 6q feet long.
The conduct of the defendants 'vas grossly negligent
and reckless and in direct violation of. Section 57-7-124
Utah Code Annotated 1943, which provides as follows:
''No vehicle shall be driven to the left side
of the center of the roadway in overtaking and
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passing another vehicle proceeding the same direction unless such left side is clearly visible and
is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such overtaking and passing to be completely made without interfering
\Vi th the safe operation of any vehicle ap·proaching frorn the opposite direction of any vehicle
overtaken. In every event the overtaking vehicle
must return to the right-hand side of the road.,vay before coming within 100 feet of any vehicle
approaching from the opposite direction.''
It is undisputed in the evidence that the defendants
failed to maintain a proper and sufficient look-out as
they attempted to pass the Pace car. Defendant claimed
that he could see 200 yards up the highway despite the
dust stor1n, hut that he wasn't looking for a car on the
opposite side of the road; that the 1fitchell car may have
been 20 to 25 feet ahead when he first saw it and "\Vas
straddle the center line; that although he was 'vatching
both sides of the highway all the time, he didn't see the
!fitchell car until it "just came out of no\vh.ere."
Defendants elailn an en1ergency; they should have
anticipated the e1nergency which was created hy their
own folly and they cannot avoid the necessary consequences of their recklessness by their inability to extricate themselves fron1 it. The evidence of excessiYe speed
under the circun1sta.nces proceeded from the mouth of
the defendant Van Patten.
Vv·e sincerely contend that under the evidence plaintiff was entitled to a directed verdict on the liability of
the defendants, though none V\ras requested.
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(b) I'here zcas no substant-ial evidence of
contribu_.ta.ry neglige-nce u:hich u~a.rra·nterl t'he subnl.i~~si.on of tha:f defen.se to the Jury.

The defendants rely upon the 'vitness Pace and the
defendant \Tan Patten for their evidence of contributory
negligence~ and very little con1fort is available to them
from the testin1on}- of either. The ntnnerous inconsistencies of \7" an Patten's alibi have been previously pointed
out. Although , . . an Patten insisted :1fitchell "\vas astraddle the center line, he is most indefinite about the
approach of the ~~fitehell car, on n1ore than one occasion
repeating that plaintiff just came out of no,vhere. The
most significant thing \'an Patten said in regard to the
r11anner in 'vhich plaintiff "\Vas driving his car was that. he
did not think ~{r. itfitchell was to blame (R. 451).
The 'vitness Pace provided defendants "\vith no substantial help in the discharge of their burden to prove
contributory negligence. It is true that he stated that
plaintiff's truck was "probably" straddle of the center
line when he saw it (R.472), but he testified that he was·
not required to alter the course of his :au'tomob~e by the
approach of the ~fitchell car and was able to continue
straight on his way undisturbed, and that if the plaintiff n1ay have momentarily traveled on the center line it
vvasn't sufficiently far to interfere with the movement of
Pace's ·car in the opposite direction (R. 477), and all this
in view of th·e fact that Pace was as near to the middle of
his lane of traffic a.s he could get (R. 471).
More-over, the 'vitness Pace could only say that as
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near as he could tell plaintiff was straddle of the center
line (R. 478), but he could not say about how much of
plaintiff's vehicle was on the west of the center line and
he would not attempt to say that plaintiff's vehicle was
as much as a foot to the west of the center line, but that
as near as he could tell, plaintiff was riding very near the
center lin·e (R.. 478).
We deen1 it altogether fair to say that I:.> ace did not
furnish any evidence which aided the defendants in their
defense of contributory negligence. It must he remenlbered that Pace was in advance of the defendant's truck
and ordinarily his position \Vould be more likely to he imperiled by the approach of a car on the 'vrong side in the
opposite direction than the defendants, yet he was not
endangered to the slightest extent. We cannot perceive
in 1vhat possible manner the location of plaintiff's car
very near the eenter line before the impact could have
had any causal relationship· with the -collision which oceurred on the extreme east side of the highway. It is ineseap;ably clear that 'the cause of the C'ollision was the
presence of the A-rrowhead truck on the wrong side of the
road, making an unsuccessful attemp't to p:ass another vehicle in a dust storn1 in violation of the laws of the road
and in reckless disregard of plaintiff's bodily safety.
We earnestly invite the eourt to consideT in connection with the flimsy evidence of 'the ,defen·dants, 'the positive testimony of Mr. Mitehell, his father and his daughter, where plaintiff's operati'On of his- car was s·hown to
he vvithout fault and the testimony of Dr. Broadbent to
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the effect that ,.,. an Patten adn1itted his responsibility
for the accident. stating that Hit 'vas entirely my fault."
(R. 255)

Finally, the physical facts corroborate the plaintiff's position and refute that of the defendants. The defendants can never escape the fact that they collided with
the left front eorner of plaintiff's truck on the extreme
east side of the high,vay .

. A..t the time of the trial the defendants amended their
answer to set forth an additional affirmative defens.e,
to-\vit: that the plaintiff drove his 1946 Chevrolet truck
while the truck was overloaded with 4 people in the front
seat, in violation of Section 57-7-170 Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which interfered with his control of the
mechanism of the truck and thereby affected his ability
to readily n1aneuver said truck and avoid a collision.
There was not one word of evidence in the record that
sho\ved that four people overloaded plaintiff's truck, or
that the presence of the four passengers in the front seat
interefered \Yith plaintiff'~ driving; and if it \Vas negligence to have four people in the truck under the circumstances of this case, it was negligence in the air without
an~v causal connection whatever with the collision. It was,
therefore, error for the court to give its instruction No.
16, \Vhich per1nitted the jury to consider this unestablish defense and to deny recovery to plliaintiff in the
event they should believe the plaintiff's driving was intP.rfered with by the overloading of his car. With respect
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to the overloading of his truck, the plaintiff testified as
follows:
Now in driving the car up at the scene
of the accident with your daughter sitting beside you, did your arm rub against her to any
'' Q.

extent~

A.

I wasn't crowded.

Q.

You were not

A.

No, sir.

crowded~

If you went to move the wheel rapidly
do you think-you know whether or not your
arm interfered with her in any way when you,
just before that accident up at-~
Q.

A.

I would say it didn't." (R. 352)
Joan ~1itchell in this connection testified as follows:

"Q. You say you were sitting in the middle
of the seat, Joan, between two other people~
A.

Yes.

Q.

How close \Vere you to your father's

arm~

A. I don't think he would hav·e hit me if
anything had hap~pened.
Q.

Do you know whether he did or

A.

No. he didn't." (R. 867)

not~

Assu1ning rt!he sufficiency of the evidence of
contrib·utory negligence the oouri, nevertheless, fully
submitted amd overemphasized suc'h defens1e t1o lt.he jury.
(c)
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~truction

No. 1 ( R. f)3) the court only gave two instruc-

tions submitting to the jury plaintiff's theory of reeoYery, instruction~ 7 and 8; and the court conditioned
recoYery in instruction No. 8 upon the jury finding ''that
plaintiff 'Yas operating his vehicle in a lawful manner
upon his side of the highway i1nmediately prior to and at
the time of the collision.'' ( R. 65). Yet in ·addition to the
statement of defendants' ·claims in instruction No. 2 (R.
58), the court gave the follo,ving instructions on defendants' theory of contributory negligence : Nos. 10, 11, 12,
13, 14 15 and 16. Plaintiff exeepted to the giving of each
of these instruction as being against the evidence and
plaintiff further excep:ted to all of the instructions numbered 9 to 16 inclusive for the special reason that the said
instructions placed undue emphasis upon the theory of
the defendan'ts and were -contrary to the evi·dence taken
together. (R. 543) Th·e number of instructions given by
the co1.1.rt in view of the paucity of the evidence in the
record in sup·port of defendant's theory 'vas far out of
proportion and constituted an overe1nphasis of the unestablished defen-se of contributory neglig.ence. See 1
Blashfield 's Instructions Juries, Section 152., page 351 :
''It is imp-roper for the court to place too
prominently before the jury any p·rinciple of law
involved in the case as by frequent r·epetition for
\vhere a number of instructions announces in
varying language a single rule of law the effect
is to unduly imp·ress the single principle announced upon the jury's minds to the exclusion
perhaps of other equally important principles.''
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The defendants in their brief object to the courts
instruction No. 6 and 7 on the ground that the two instructions eliminated contributory negligence as a defense. They cite numerous cases, the one most nearly in
point being the case of Beyerle v. Clift, (Cal) 209 Pac.
1015 frorn which they quote at some length in their brief.
'"rhat case lays down a principle that it is error for the
trial court to fail to condition recovery in a so-called
formula instruction upon the absence of contributory
negligence assu1ning that the issue of contributory negligence was properly before the court. The effect of the
Beyerle v.· Clift case has been avoided in several subsequent California descisions to which we shall subsequently refer. Be that as it may, the Supreme Court of
Utah has adopted a contrary rule.
The case of Olsen v. Oregon S. L. R. R. Co., 24
Utah 460, 68 Pac. 148 involved an action for the
\Vrongful death of a person who was struck by defendant's train at a crossing. The plaintiff's decedent \vas
attempting to cross the tracks in a wagon vvhen the defendant's train at a high speed and without giving warning of its ap.proach struck the wagon, killing the deceased. We quote from the decision commencing at page
152 of Pacific Reports:
''Exception is taken to instruction No. 19,
wherein the court told the jury: 'If you find from
the evidence that the crossing upon which the deceased was kill·ed wa.s a public highway, and had
been used as such for a long number of years
prior to the accident, and if you further find that
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a large nun1ber of tearns and persons passed over
said crossing each day, and at all hours of the
day, then I charge you that it 'vas the duty of the
engineer of the train, "rhen approaching the crossing., to have been on the lookout for teams and
persons on the crossing, or in such close p-roxinlity thereto as to be in danger of colliding with
the train, then to use all reasonable care and diligence and make use of all the appliances at his
command to have the train under control, and
stop if necessary to avoid a collision with and
injury to such team or persons; and if you further
find that the engineer was negligent in not keeping such lookout, and in not discovering the peril
of the deceased in time to have avoided the accident, and that he did or could have discov-ered
him, and the peril he was in, in time to avoid the
collision, if he had been on the lookout, then I
c!large you that the defendant is liable for the
killing of Olson, and the plaintiffs ar·e entitled
to recoYer in this action.' This instruction should
be considered and construed in connection with
the other instructions bearing upon the whole
subject. The seventh instruction reads as follO\\-s: 'You are charged that it was the duty of
the deceased, as he approached the said crossing
just before the time of the accident which resulted
in his death, to both listen for and look in the
direction fron1 which the train approached, to
ascertain if any train was approaching, and it
was his duty to continue to so listen and look
until he had crossed said railroad. The failure
of the company, if it did, to ring the bell, sound
its whistle, or give any alarm of its approach,
did not relieve the deceas-ed from the obligation
to perform the said duty of listening and looking, and if the said deceased, as he approached
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said crossing, by the use of his senses of sight
and hearing in looking and listening for the approach of the said train, could have discovered
that it was approaching, and have avoided said
collision, then the plaintiffs cannot recover in
this case.' The eighth instruction is as follows:
'If, without so looking and listening for an approaching train, a person attempts to cross a
railroad track, and is injured by a passing train,
his own careless conduct is deemed, in law, to have
assisted in bring about the injury, and he cannot
complain of the other party concerned in the
transaction, even though such other p~arty may
have also been negligent.' It is contended that
the tenth instruction omits the subject of contributory negligence. The charge, taken as a whole,
·fully covered the question of negligence on the
part of the defendant, and_ contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. It is not always
possible to cover all the questions arising in a
case in one sentence or paragraph. It is sufficient
if the whole charge, when taken and construed
together, states the law fairly and correctly. As
said in Hamer v. Bank, ·g Utah, 220, 33 Pac. 941:
'The mere omission in one part of the charge by
the court of certain elements, though material,
when they are substantially given in another part,
will not be ground for reversing the judgment.
On this point, Thomp.son, in his work on Trials
(Volume 2, Section 2407), states the law as follows: 'The charge is entitled to a reasonable interpretation. It is construed as a whole, in the
same connected way in which it was given, upon
the presum'ption that the jury did not overlook
any portion, but gave due w·eight to it as a whole;
and this is so although it consist of clauses originating with different counsel, and applicable to
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different phases of the evidence. If, when so construed, it presents the la'v fairly and correctly
to the jury, in a n1anner not calculated to mislead
then1, it "Till afford no ground for reversing the
judg1nent. althol1gh so1ne of its expressions, if
standing alone, nug·ht be regarded as erroneous,
or because there may be an apparent conflict bet,veent isolated sentences, or because its parts
Inay be in some respects slightly repugnant to
each other, or because some of them, taken abstractedly, may have been erroneous." ' Ander~on v. ~lining Co., 16 Utah 38, 50 Pac. 815; Sta;te
YS. ~IeCoy·, 15 Utah 141, 49 Pac. 420; Reese vs.
~fining Co., 17 Utah 496, 54 Pac. 759."
If instruction No. 7 and instructions No. 10, 11, 12,
13, 14, 15 and 16 were consolidated into one instruction
and given by the trial court, there could be no error.
There is no eonflict of the lavv in the different instructions and if taken together or considered as a series,
they present the la'v n1uch more favorably to the defendants than they were entitled. They, therefore, have no
just complaint .
.A.nother Utah case directly in point in this respect
is the case of :Jforgan "'"l. }[ammoth ~fining Co., 1903, 72
Pac. 88, which involved an instruction that directed a
verdict for the plaintiff if the jury an1ong other things
found that certain chairs which struck plaintiff \vere out
of repair or out of \Yorking order. The instruction did
not cPntain a qualification that the chairs mllSt have been
out of repair a sufficient length of ti1ne to enable the
defendant by· the exercise of ordinary care, to discover
and re1nedy the defect, a for1nula instruction 'vith a
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necessary element missing. The court said, at page 689:
''This criticism might be regarded as having
some force if the matter of knowledge of the defective condition of the chairs ~r notice thereof
were explained nowhere else in the charge. In
paragraph 5, however, the law respecting this
subject is clearly stated ... when, therefore, the
two paragraphs are read together, and are considered in connection with the evidence to the
effect that the defects had existed for a period of
about 2 months prior to the time of the accident,
there appears to be no reason for assuming or
holding that the jury were misled, under these circumstances. It being conceded that paragraph
6, abstractly considered, does not state the law
vvith absolute precision, still it does not amount to
reversible error. Where, as here, a charge considered as a whole states the law applicable to
the case fairly and correctly, it is sufficient. Olsen
vs. OSLRR, 24 Utah 460, 68 Pac. 148.''
The holding in the Beyerle v. Clift ease also flies in
the face of our statute, Section 104-39-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which provides: No exception shall he
raised unless the decision excepted to is material and
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the parties excepting.''
The case of State v. McCoy, 15 Utah 141, 49 Pac.
421, holds as follows :
'' . . . . Instructions must be considered together and omission to fully state the la'v in one
part of the instruction, where the omission is fully
and accurately sup,plied in the instructions which
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follo,v, does not constitute reversible error, unless when from the whole charge it is reasonably
apparent the jury 'vere misled, citing cases.''
To the sa1ne effect is the case of Roth v. Chatlos, 97
Conn. 282, 116 . .\tlantic, 332. In that ease the court gave
the follow·ing instructions, appearing at page 333:
"If you find that the .defendants' driver, by
siinply continuing on the right hand side of the
highway, could have avoided the accident, then
your verdict must necessarily be for the plaintiff. He n1ust prove one of the grounds of negligence, but he need not prove all of them ; and
if you find that said automobile was being driven
at a dangerous rate of speed and that said accident could not have been avoided had said automobile been driven at a lower speed, then your
verdict must necessarily be for the plaintiff.
''This request was ·erroneously received since
it left out of consideration the plaintiff's contributory negligence and left to the jury the determination of the defendant's conduct as the sole
issue of the jury's verdict, when the plaintiff's
conduct, as well as the defendant's was upon the
claims of the parties and the evidence before the
jury, essential to a proper verdict.
''This request was read to the jury in the
early part of the charge, and thereaft,er with
great fullness and sufficient accuracy, the trial
court properly p·resented to the jury both of these
issues :-the negligence of the defendant, and the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff. This was
done in such a way, that we think it quite impossible that the jury should have failed to have
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understood that their finding that the plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence would bar
his recovery, and so too, we think the jury must
have understood in what the plaintiff's contributory negligence was claimed to have consisted.''
The principle is also recognized in 14 Ruling Case
I_.~aw, 813:
''And also instructions given ignoring facts
tending to establish a defens-e, the defendant cannot complain if such defense is covered in other
instructions given at his request.''
To the same effect is St. Louis Southeast Railway
Co. v. Graham, Arkansas, 102 Southwest 700 ·at 702:
"Criticisms are made of some of the instructions in that they seem to permit a recovery if
the jury finds the defendant guilty of negligence,
without qualification, and unless they find the
deceased not guilty of contributory negligence.
Taking thes·e instructions as a whole, the court
thinks that they make it clear to the jury that
contributory negligence on the part of the deceased would defeat a recovery, even should they
find the defendant guilty of negligence. It is generally impossible to state all the law of the case
in one instruction, and if the various instructions
separately present every phase of its as a harInonious whole, there is no error in each instruction faiHng to carry qualifications which ar·e ·explained in others, citing cases.''
See also Meadows v. Pacific Mutual Life· Insurance
Co., l\fisf:ouri, 1895, 31 Southwest 578.
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In the California case of Bro\Yer Y. Arnstein, 14 Pac.
2d 863, the court attempts to distinguish the facts of that
ease frou1 the earlier ~ase of Beyerle v. Clift, supra, but
nevertheless holds that the giving of for1nula instructions
ackno,vledged to lack esstential elements of recovery
" . .as not reversible error \vhere other"}'ise instructed
upon. \"'{e quote fron1 that case beginning at page 865 :
··Appellant also urges various and sundry
clain1s of error against instructions given and refused by the trial court. The most vigorously
pressed of these clain1s relate to the alleged failure of certain so-called 'formula' instructions
to individually contain a recital of all the elements
essential to recovery by plaintiff. If these instructions are by a process of dislocation fro1n the general charge, so separated from each other as to
then be viewed ''ith over-technical nicety, they
\Yould unquestionalbly be subject to the objections urged by appellant. But the very method
of the giving of these so-called 'formula'' instructions indicates plainly that they were not intended
to so operate or to have such effect. They were
merely intended in the first instance to advise
the jury how their verdict should go in the event
the respectiv.e matters set forth in the pleadings
were either established or failed of establishment
one way or the other. In other 'vords, the instructions were not intended to, nor did they purport
to state the several elements essential to a verdict
as such in detail, but, instead, those matters were
made the subject of separate specific instructions;
the court's intention being merely to supply by
reference to the pleadings a statement as to how
the verdict of the jury should go in the event
plaintiff did or did not establish negligence as
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charged in his pleadings, or in the event he did
so establish negligence as charged in his pleadings, or in the event he did so establish such negligenee, how in such event the verdict should then
go if contributory negligence was or was not established. They were not 'fon:nula' instructions
of the type condemned in Beyerle v. Clift, 59 Cal.
App. 7, 9, 209 P. 1015, where the pleaded element
of contributory negligence was entirely omitted
from an instruction directing a verdict. However,
the particular omission in the instructions upon
which ap~pellant places the most stress is their
s·erious failure to at any time define or express in
direct terms the principle of 'proximate cause.'
This is indeed a most serious omission, and we
are not unmindful that in reversing the case of
Long v. Barbieri (Cal.) App. 7 P. (2d) 1082., 1087,
because of certain instructions of a more obviously ·erroneous character, we indicated the added
weight that had been given the errors in question because of the similar failure of the trial
court to define 'proximate cause,' by declaring:
'It should be further noted that the trial court
omitted to give any instruction whatsoever defining 'p·roximate caus·e,' and the jury were thus
left to their own varying conceptions, if any, as
to what might constitute this always related and
ev~er essential principle of the doctrines of negligence and contributory negligence.'
''It must therefore be conceded that in failing to directly define and present to the jury for
their consideration, the legal principle embraced
within the term 'p,roximate cause' the trial court
committed an ·error of no inconsiderable magnitude. Its effect, however, is substantially weakened and mitigated in the present case by and
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tailed instructions given by the court at the request of defendant, in 'vhich almost every conceivable element of the multitude of defensive
principles of law. open to and urged by him were
specifically presented to the jury. These directly
set forth the Inany and num·erous circumstances
upon " . .hich, in the event their existence was established by the evidence, the verdict of the jury
1nay just be for defendant, or plaintiff could not
reeover; and a.n1ong these in connection with the
terms 'negligence' or 'negligent' the word 'p·roximately' is frequently used.
~'The jury was also instructed: ' * * * Where
negligence is charged, it devolves upon the person
charging it, if he \vould prevail as to that charge,
to establish * * * it by a preponderance of evidence.' The court also, and as a part of its general charge, re-peatedly instruct the jury in the
utmost detail upon numerous matters that would
constitute negligence on the part of plaintiff, and
thus defeat recovery. At no time did the ap.pellant now urging the error of its omission, tender
to the court an instruction defining 'proximate
cause,' or request that qualifying instructions to
those of which he complains be given.
''The cumulatjve effect of these considerations leads us to place our determination of the
merit of appellant's contention (that the failure
of these instructions to ·define 'proximate cause'
is reversible error) fairly within the scope of the
expression of a similar determination arrived at
by our Supreme Court, in Wirthman v. Isensein,
182 Cal. 108, 110, 111, 187 P. 12, 13, where it is
declared: ' * * * where, as here, the court instructs that, to entitle respondent to recover, ap~
pellants must be guilty of negligence 'as alleged
in the complaint', and that respondent himself
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1nust be blameless and free from any contributory negligence, it must have been made perfectly
clear to the jury that a finding by them that ap·pellants were guilty of the negligence so described,
the respondent himself being blameless, would of
necessity runount to a finding that such negligence
was the proximate cause of the injury. Weaver
vs. Carter, 28 Cal. App. 241, 152 P. 323. Furthermore, the court's instructions, so far as they went,
correctly stated the law, and if appellants desired a qualifying instruction to the effect that,
to entitle respondent to recover, appellants' negligence 1nust be the proximate cause of the injury,
it \vas incumbent upon ,their counsel to either
ask the court to give such qualifying instruction,
which it undoubtedly would have done, or have
presented an instruction e1nbodying it. Having
failed to do either, appellants are in no position
to con1plain of the instructions given. Weaver
vs. Carter, supra; Townsend vs. Butterfield, 168
Cal. 564, 143 P. 760; O'Connor vs. United Railroads, 168 Cal. 43, 141 P. 809.' "
Abbot Y. Goodyear rrire & Rubber Co. (California)
3 Pac. 2d 56, 57, is a very good case. l't states:
"Ap~pellant first complains of instruction
12, which infor1ns the jury as to the amount
of recovery to \Vhich respondents are entitled if
the jury finds certain facts to be true. The criticism of the instruction is that it is a 'formula'
instruction 'vhich fails to include the essential
elen1ent of knowledge of the falsity of the representations on the ·part of the appellant. There
are several ans,vers to the criticism. Tt 'vill suffice to say that in instructions 1 to 11 the jury
had been advised of the allegations of the complaint charging fraud; that instruction No. 3
~J o.
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particularly dealt \vith the allegations respecting
Datml's knowledge of the falsity of the representations co1nplained of; and that instruction No. 12
directed a verdict for respondents if the jury
found that all these representations· were made
and that respondents had been deceived 'as alleg·ed '. The con1plaint fully alleged ·every essential eleinent for recovery in a case of this kind
and the instruction co1nplained of took all these
allegations into consideration. This is not a ·case
of a directed verdict on a single is_sue or upon a
limited nlmlber of the issues involved. All the
instructions n1ust be read together and, in so reading then1, \Ve find no conflict between No. 12 and
those preceding, but a general summary telling
for a Yerdict. The case is somewhat similar to
the jury of every element whieh must be found
Robinet v. H·awks, 200 Gal. 265, 273, 252, P. 1045,
where the trial court used the expression 'under
the instructions as I have given them to you.' See
also Douglas v. Southern Pacific Co., 203 Cal.
390, 394, 2·64 P. 237, vvhere the Supreme Court
holds in effect that where, as here, the instruction
con1plained of does not purport to be a complete
statement of the lavv upon which plaintiff's might
recover and the other instructions are amplifications of and not in conflict wiht that instruction
the objection of' forn1ula' instruction is not sound.
Putting it in other words, when the t;one of the
instructions as a whole denot.es that no single
instruction w·as iJnt·ended to be a .comp.Zete st1at:e1nent in itself b~tt tha;t all the instructi.ons ~are to
be t.aken togeth,er 0/Yltd, when thes,e irnsfiruct ions
fully aud oorrectly sta.te the law ~v·ithout conflict,
_then n.o 10ne instruction m.a.y be singled out for
criticis1n beoause it does n.ot completely state
all the elements necessary for recovery.''
1
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In its instructions 1 and 2, the court set out a sumInarized statement of the issue, No. 1 containing the
claims of the plaintiff and No. 2 containing the claims of
the defendant as raised by the pleadings. Then the
court gave the following instruction No. 3:
''You are instructed that, before the plaintiff
can recover on his first cause of action, that said
plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence one or n1ore of the acts of neg1igenee
alleged by hiin in his complaint, his injury and
damage, and that said alleged negligence upon the
part of the defendants was the proximate cause
of his injury and damage ; and, in this connection,
you are instructed that, unless the plaintiff meets
this burden, that he is not entitled to recover, and
you are instructed that you should find the issues
in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff. You are likewise instructed that, if the evidence on these issues is equally balanc.ed between
the plaintiff and the defendants, or preponderates
in favor of the defendants, that you should find
the issues in favor of the defendants and against
the plaintiff. If. hovvever, the plaintiff does prove
one or 1nore of the acts acts of negligence on the
part of the defendants, his damage and injury,
and that said negligence was the pToximate cause
thereof by preponderance of the evidence, then
the plaintiff is entitled to have the issue of liability decided in his favor, and against the defendants, and you are to assess damages therefor
in accordance with the instructions hereinafter
given you upon the 1neasure of damages, unless
you find by a preponderance of the evidence that
the plaintiff 'vas guilty of one or more of the acts
of negligenee alleged hy the defendants which
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proximately caused, or proxin1ately contributed
to, the plaintiff's injury and damage, the burden
of v.rhich is upon the defendants to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence.''
Here, in1n1ediatel~~ follo,ving the statement of the
claims of the parties the court instructed that plaintiff
could not recoYer if he 'vas guilt~T of one or n1ore of the
acts of contributory negligence eharged by the defendant.
The case seems to fit perfectly into the exception to the
rule of Beyerle Y. Clift, supra, laid down by the more
recent California case of Abbot v. Goodyer Tire & Rubber Company, supra.
Further indication that the tone of the instructions
was to the effect that they must he considered as a whole
is found in the court's instruction No. 14 wherein the
court stated: . . . ''and that said collision was solely
caused, or proximately contributed to by the carelessness
and negligence of plaintiff, J. Harold Mitchell, if any
you find, ,as outlined in these instruotions, then plaintiff
cannot recover and your verdict should be in favor of
defendants and against plaintiff, no cause of action.''
Moreover instruction No. 5 defines the various
terms that appear in the various instructions.
Again in its Instruction No. 9 the court stated:
~'Therefor,

if for any reason you find ther,e
is no liability in this case on the part of the defendant, Marvin C. Van Patten, as defilned in these
;inst.ructions, then you will find there is no liability
on the part of both defendants.''
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That instruction directs the attention of the JUry
to the instructions as a whole.
In its Instruction 25 the court told the jury:
''You should weigh the evidence carefully
and consider all of it together ...
''You should consider all the evidence impartially, fairly and 'vithout prejudice of any
·kind, and from such consideration, in connecti.orn
tvith the instruc~ions given you by t'he aovurt, you
should reach such a verdict as will do justice betvveen the parties.' '
1'hat instruction in effect told the jury that the instructions should be considered together in connection
with the evidence.
Certainly, it is fair to state that the " tone of the
instructions as a whole" denoted "that no single instruction was intended to be a compiete statement in itself,
but that the instructions were to be taken together.''
Also holding that the instructions must he considered as a whole is the case of Nell v. Smith, Iowa, 147
N. W. 183.
Counsel refer to the case of Saltas v. Affle·ck,
'99 Utah 381, 105 P. 2d 1'76, on page 47 ·of their
brief, and state that 't~he couJrt held that the imposition of a greater duty upon the defendant that the
law requires was p·rejudicial error. That case 'vas reversed upon the ground of prejudicial conduct on the
part of plaintiff's counsel, in questioning the jury- panel
in regard to liability insurance. There was further error
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on the part of the trial court in giving an instruction
to the .effect that it was the du1ty of the defendant to
drive his automobile on the higll\vay, using reasonable
eare and prudence so that he could avoid injuring anyone, or coljding with any person on the highvva.y. ''The
col1rt held that the instruction failed to take into account
the right of the defendant to assume that all other persons on the high\vay 'vould use ordinary care and reasonable precautions for their own safety. The opinion does
not state that. the error was prejudicial and the ease w:as
apparently reversed on the ground of misconduct of
colmsel. In his special concurring opinion, concurred in
by I\Ir. Justice \Volfe, ~fr. Justice ThicDonough stated that
\vhile the instruction taken alone, 1vas erroneous, the instructions read as a whole could not have misled the
jury, and consequently, the giving of the instruction was
not reversible error.
The recent case of Martin v. Sheffield, 189 Pac. 2d.
127, does not support defendant's position. In that case·
there was evidence which would have justified a finding
of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff yet
the court gave no instructions submitting this theory of
defense to the jury, except t'\vo stock instructions, one
defining contributory negligence, but telling the jury
nothing with respect to its legal effect, the other relating
to the burden of proof. In that case Chief Justice McDonough states :
''Such instruction, unelucidated in any other
. part of the charge, might well be construed by the
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jury to mean that though the jury found negligence on the part of the plaintiff which ,proxilnately contributed to the accident, nevertheless,
plain tiff was entitled to a verdict.
''Viewing the instructions as a whole, we
.conclude that the court failed although requested
by the defendant to do so, to advise the jury as
to the effect of alleged negligence on the part of
the p~laintiff, should it find that such negligence
proximately contributed to her own injury. This
was pr·ejudicial error.
'' ... We are mindful of the rule that an in·
struction must be read in the light of the whole
charge in determining whether it was calculated to
mislead the jury. A careful examination of the
whole charge convinces us that the misleading
effect of instruction No. 9 was not erased by the
import of the instructions as a whole.''
In eliminating the words, ''such instruction, unelucidated in any other part of the charge'' from their quotation of the Chief Justice's statement, counsel imparted
an effeet to it quite foreign to the import of the stateInent as a whole. Fully quoting the expression confirms
our position and renders defendants' untenable. We fe·el
constrained to remind counsel for the defendants, that
to partially quote is to misquote, and the op~inions of
this court, like the instructions to the jury, must be construed as a whole, or they may be misconstrued.
In the Sheffield case, there wa.s no other instruction,
submitting the theory of contributory negligence to the
jury. In this case, the theory was pres~ented in each
of the follo"~ing instructions: Nos. 2, 3, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
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15 and 16. It \Vould be flying in the fare of the record
to say that the failure of the court to condition recover~y
upon the absence of eontributory negligence in its instruction X o. 7. \\Tas not other\Yise elucidated b~· the
charge.
The court a1nplified its instruction No. 6 ~etting
forth the n1aster ·s responsibility for the negligent act
or omissions of its servants by Instruction No. 9. In
Instruction No. 9 (R. 66) the court instructed the jury
as follo,vs :

· ·1~ ou are instructed that in this case, there
is no claim of any careless or negligent act
on the part of the defendant, Arrowhead Freight
Lines, Ltd., a corporation and there is no evidence
of negligence on the part of said defendant.
The only negligence claimed is on account of the
acts or conduct of th·e defendant, Marvin C. Van
Patten, in driving and operating the truck and
trailer he was driving at the time of the accident.
Therefore, if there is any liability upon the part
of the defendant, Arrowhead Freight Lines, Ltd.,
it must be based upon the liability of the defendant, ~I arvin C. \l an Patten, for his act or acts
in the op.eration of said truck and not because of
any nlisconduct on the part of the defendant,
. A.rro"'.,.head Freight Lines, Ltd., by reason of the
la\v "~hich makes an employer responsible for the
acts of its employees performed 'vithin the course
and scope of their employment.
''Therefore, if for any rea.son you find there
is no liability in this ca.se on the part of the defendant, Marvil C. 'Tan Patten, as define-d in
these instructions, then you will find there is no
liability on the part of both defendants."
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Moreover, as was heretofore pointed out, there was
no substantial evidence of contributory negligence
in this cas-e. So that such defense was not properly before the court and should not have been submitted to
the jury. Therefore, the trial court was not authorized
or required to qualify its Instruction No. 7 with a condition that the jury 1nust f1nd plaintiff free from contributory negligence.
~gain

Instruction No. 7 represented a proper statement of the law. There was no improper language or
1nis-sta.tement of principle in the instruction. It 'vas not,
therefore, contrary to or in conflict with any other instruction given by the court. An inconsistent instruction
would be one, for instance, where the court would state
to the jury that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff
and then subsequently charging that the burden of proof
of the same matter was on the defendants. There was no
state1nent made in any part of the court's charge which
vvas inconsistent with any statement contained in Instruction No. 7.
The court's Instruction 1\fo. 6 was not a formula
instruction. It n1erely presented to the jury the legal
princip[e of respondeat 'Superior so that the jury would
know that the master is liable for the negligent acts
and omissions of his servant. The jury could not have
been 1nisled by that instruction, and it contained an
altogether proper statement of a legal principle which
vvas applicable to the ·evidence in the case.
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tions No~. 6 and 7 are 'vithout 1nerit for the following
reasons.

1. The instruction No. 6 'vas not a forinula instruction but contained a p.roper state1nent of the law applicable to the evidence.
2. The court qualified instruction No. 6 by its Instruction X o. 9, 'vhich is a further indication that the
instructions were to be construed together.
3. Instruction No. 7 vvas a proper instruction on
Jne of the plaintiff's theories of recovery which was
legally accurate and sufficient and fully supported by
the evidence.
4. Although the defendants' negligence was so glaring as to constitute negligence as a matter of law, the
court, nevertheless, in the instructions objected to permitted the jury to determine whether the defendants were
negligent or not. So that under the evidence the instructions objected to were more favorable to the defendants
than the record justifies.

5. It was clear from the tenor of the instructions
given by the court that the jury was to consider all of
the instructions as a whole, and considering all of the
instructions as a whole the court not only submitted
defendants' theories to the jury, but overe1nphasized
then1.

6. There was no substantial evidence of contributory negligence and the court should not have submitted
that defense to the jury at all.
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7. rrhe defendants' exceptions, as will be argued in
the next point, \vere inadequate and were not calculated
Lo infor1n the court of the defendants' claimed defects
in the court's charge.
Poilnt 3. The defend(Jffl)ts ·d~id not properl;y
except t·o the i.nstruot~ons they now con~plain ·Of
and oannot ·ur9e such exce:ptions on a.ppe·al.
Defendants now complain that the court failed to
condition rec.overy, in giving its Instructions 6, 7, and
10, upon the absence of contributory negligence. They
made no such claim before the trial court at the time
they took their exceptions. It is true that the defendants
excepted to the whole of each instruction and also to
stated parts of each instruction, but there was nothing
in the exceptions calculated to direct the attention of
the trial c.ourt to the error claim·ed.
\V e are mindful of the provisions of Section 104-2418 Utah Code Annotated 1943, which contains the same
language as Revised Statutes 1898, Sec. 3151, to the
eff-ect that "No reasons need be given for such exceptions, but the exceptions shall he noted upon the n1inutes
of the court . . . '' This statutory provision, however,
was construed by the Supreme Court of Utah in the
case of Nebeker v. Harvey, 21 Utah 363, from which we
quote as follows, beginning at 374:

''Numerous other errors relating to the
charge of the court were assigned but in the absence of proper exceptions, we cannot consider
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them. The exception8 are too general, simply referring to "·hole paragraphs of the charge. To be
of avail in the appellate court, they 1nust sp·ecify
the particular objectionable n1atter so as to give
the trial judge an opportunity to make a correction, not,vithstanding that it is provided in Section 3131, R.evised Statutes that: 'No reason need
be given for such exceptions.' That section does
not authorize the making of wholesale exceptions
'vithout reference to the specific matter which
is claimed to be objectionable. The reason of the
rule which requires the specific objectionable matter to be pointed out in the presence of the jury,
is obvious. If the objection to the matter be well
taken, the court may then make the correction
called for and thus, not only save the expense of
another trial, but also the time of the court. The
rule has been firmly establishe·d in this state,
Poole v. Southern Pacific Co., 20 Utah 210, 58
Pac. 326, 333. Brigham City v. Crawford, 20 Utah
130, 57 Pac. 842.; Wilson v. Sioux Consolidated
Thiining Co., 16 Utah 91, ·99; People v. Hart, 10
Utah 204; Lowe v. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah 91,
99.''
To the same effect is Boyd v. San Pedro, L. A. &
S. L. R. R. Company, 45 Utah 449, 146 Pac. 282; State
v. Riley, 41 Utah 225, 126 Pac. 294; Goldberg v. Gintoff
(Vt.) 20 Atl. 2d 114; Connelly v. Felsway Motor Mart
Inc. C~fass.) 170 N. E. 467, 469; Sacramento Suburban
Fruitlands Co. v. Loucks (CCA 9) 36 Fed. 2d 921.
In the case at bar the trial court might well have
assumed that the defendants had in mind in their exception to the last six lines of Instruction No. 7 that
the court erred in permitting the jury to determine
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from a preponderance of the evidence that the negligence of the defendants was the proximate cause of the
collision; and the court was fully justified in disregarding the exception as made, for the legal principle stated
in the instruction were in all resp·ects correctly stated.
If there was any error in the instruction it was in the
onlission in that particular instruction to condition
recovery upon the absence of contributory negligence.
There was no error in the language or principle as stated.
The only way that defendants could have possibly
directed the attention of the trial court to the error of
omission would be by excepting to the failure of the
court to condition recovery in its instruction No. 7 upon
the plaintiff's freedom from contributory negligence.
That would not be necessarily the assignn1ent of a reason for the exception. Defendants would not have to
say the court erred in failing to condition recovery upon
the ·plaintiff's freedon1 from contributory negligence for
the reason, for instance, that there was evidence in the
record to support it. They would, however, be required
to call the court's attention to the necessity for amplifying the charge.
In Wilson vs. Sioux Consolidated Mining Co., 16
Utah 392, 398, Justice Bartch stated that an ·exception
to be of avail in an appellate court should, in a case where
any portion of the charge is. correct, be strictly confined
to the objectionable matter, and the judge's attention
called thereto at the time of the delivery of the charge,
so that an opportunity may be afforded him to make
correction.
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In the recent ease of Fo,vler vs. Medical Arts Building Company, et. al., 188 Pac. 2d 711, (Utah), the
Supre1ne Court of Utah eriticized the taking of general
exceptions 'vhich "~ere not calculated to advise the trial
court of the reasons for the exceptions.
An Oreg·on case in point is that of Davis vs. Puckett
Co., 14! Oregon 332, 23 Pac. 2d. 909, from which we
quote (page 334 of the Oregon 'report):

•· . . . . These exceptions fail to show any
grounds for defendants' alleged assignments of
error. These exceptions do not disclose wherein
the instructions were alleged to be incorrect or
insufficient, and did not give the trial court an
opportunity to correct the error, if any, by amplifying the instructions or eliminating objectionable matter. For these reasons we ;do not feel
warranted in considering the objections now
urged thereto. (citing cases) ''
To the same effect is Cook vs. Retzlaff, (Oregon) 99
p. 2d. 22, 23.
Defendants may claim that their exceptions were
specific in that they excepted to certain lines of the instructions, etc. Enlightening in this connection is the
case of Senita vs. Marcy, 324 Pa. 109, 188 A. 153, at
page 201 Pennsylvania reports:
''While appellants' counsel excepted particularly to this portion of the charge quoting merely
what the court said. He did not state the reason
for the exception nor call the court's attention
to the 1nistake in his recital of the evidence. When
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a trial judge errs in his comments upon testimony,
counsel must call his attention to the real testimony in the ease, if he does not, he cannot take
advantage of it on appeal."
Again in the case of Shortino vs. Salt Lake & Utah
l{ailroa.d Company, 52 Utah 476, 174 Pac. 869, 866, the
court made the following staternent:

.

''Counsel for defendant excepted to 20 of
the 35 paragraphs. The exception invariably
reads as follows: 'Defendant excepts to instruetion No. ____ ,' stating the number of the paragraph
excepted to. We have repeatedly held-indeed,
-vve have so often decided it that it has become ,elernentary-that unless the entire paragraph is vulnerable such an exception presents nothing for
review. As before stated, each paragraph of the
court's charge, with p,erhaps one or two exceptions, containHd more than one legal pToposition.
A general exception to the whole paragraph,
therefore, may refer to any one of several propositions contained in the paragraph. The purpose
of taking an exception to an instruction is to direct the trial court's attention to the legal proposition 'vhich it is contended is faulty. The fault may
lie in an omission, or in a word, a phrase, or sentence, or in several sentences. vVhile no reason
need be assigned for the exception, yet if an
alleged faulty statement of law consists in a word,
phrase, or sentence, or in a series of sentences,
the exception should be limited to such word,
phrase, sentence, or sentences, so that the trial
court n1ay examine them, and, if possible, correct
the error. If, therefore, an exception is to the
whole paragra:ph, it is a matter of mere conjecture
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cepted to. Nor does such a general exception present anything to this court for review unless the
'vhole paragraph excepted to is faulty, which is
seldom the case. In vievv, therefore, of the general nature of the exceptions, we cannot review
the 1na.ny errors assigned relating to the instruction.'·
In eonclusion, on this point \Ve -will quote fron1 1
Blashfield 's Instructions Juries, Second Edition, Page

937:
'' Inasn1uch as only errors will be considered
on ap·peal as are called to the attention of the
trial court, it follows that exceptions must specify
particularly the alleged error complained of. A
party excepting n1ust make his exceptions so specific that the matter relied on as error will he
apparent to his adversary, and to the primary
court. For his adversary having his attention
directed to the special matter relied on as erroneous has the right and privilege of waiving such
1natter, rather than, by insisting on it, incur the
hazard and delay of an appeal to a superior tribual. The court having its attention directed to
the erroneous matter, might be· satisfied with the
error into which it may have fallen through inadvertence and could voluntarily correct it by a
reversal of its rulings and thus protect the party
excepting from all injury.
''The exceptions should not be less definite
and specific than when made in the appellate
court, and exceptions which do not clearly and
specifically point out the objectionable part of
the instructions can not be sustained. It should
also he noted that upon obvious principles only
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those grounds of exceptions will be considered on
appeal which were stated to the trial court.''
It is clear from the foregoing authorities that the
purpose of exceptions is not to permit a defendant to
cagily conceal the purpose of the exception and the
basis of it from the trial court in order to lay the foundation for a reversal on appeal. But the purpose of the
exception is to apprise the trial court of the p_articular
error con1plained of in order to enable the trial court
to re-exan1ine his instruction and if possible correct the
error by amplifying his charge or by deleting from his
charge the objectionable material. We think it fair to
say that none of the defendants' exceptions to the instructions given by the court met with these standards,
and that none of the exceptions taken in the trial were
calculated to direct the court's attention to the errors
con1plained of.
P.o~nt

The court did not err -in its failture
t.o give defendants' requ:ested instructions.
4.

The defendants object to the failure of the court to
give the second half of their requested instruction No. 6.
They assert that the court erred in not including the
follo\\~ing language in its instruction No. 13:
''And if you find from the evidence that the
plaintiff, J. Harold ~Iitchell, was guilty of any
negligence in approaching on his \vrong side of
the highway \vhen there was traffic approaching
fro1n the opposite direction, and that hy reason
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thereof, the defendant, ~farvin C. \ .. an I->atten was
prevented fro1n seeing ~aid pick-up truck driven
hy plain tiff a.s soon as he could or would otherwise
have seen it had it been upon its proper side of the
high,vay, or that the plaintiff, J. Harold Mitchell,
\Vas thereby prevented from seeing the truck a.s
soon as he could or \vould otherwise have seen it,
and that such negligence on the part of plaintiff
proxin1ately contributed in any degree to cause
the collision, then plaintiff cannot recover, and
your verdict should be in favor of defendants and
against the plaintiff, no cause of action, even if
you should find there was also negligence on the
part of the defendant, l\1:arvin C. \Tan Patten."
(R. 90-91).
The defendants' position in this respect is without
merit. The defendants "\vhile op.erating their truck were
required to \Vatch both sides of the high\vay, particularly
while passing another vehicle going in the same direction. ..A.s was pointed out in the cross :examination of
\:---an Patten, the defendant Van Patten -could not know
\Vhether it was safe to attempt to pass the Pace car until
he had surveyed the right side of the high,vay to determine, for instance, if there was any ear ahead of Pace. lie
would have to know that in order to form a proper judg~
ment as to whether he had sufficient time in view of the
restricted visibility to get his sixty foot long truck and
trailer safely ahead of the truck p·roceeding in his direction before any other vehicle approached within 100
feet from the op~posite direction. (57-7-124, U.C.A. 1943)
Furthermore, defendants overlooked the fact that
they claim to have been continually watching both sides
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of the highway as they were attempting to pass the Pace
vehicle. (R. 446). Combining the duty of watching both
sides of the highway, \vith Van Patten's assertion that
he was perforrning that duty, the defendants were not
entitled to be surprised by the presence of the plaintiff
near or straddle the center line. Again if Van Pa~ten
could see 200 yards ahead of him as he claimed, Van
J:latten regarding the higlT\vay with watchful eyes could
have observed the plaintiff in ample tim.e to remain in
or get back into his proper lane and thus avoid the accident, traveling as ·he was at the speed of approximately
twenty miles per hour.
In their assignment No. 12 the defendants clain1
the court erred in refusing to give defendants' requested
Instruction No. 9, in \vhich, in effect, the court \Vas requested to instruct the jury that it was the duty of the
plaintiff to avoid creating an emergency, and to avoid
the collision by pulling over on the west shoulder or
passing in between the Pace vehicle and defendants'
truck and trailer. Again counsel overlooked the evidence
in the case from which the conclusion is compelling that
whatever emergency existed was created by the reckless
folly of \Tan Patten, and the defendants had no right to
ask the court to tell the jury that Mitchell should place
his car in the path of the innocent Pace vehicle rather
than in their own where the plaintiff rightfully belonged.
Nor did they have the right to have the court tell the
jury that they may find that plaintiff wa.s negligent in
failing to pa.ss between the Pace vehicle and defendants'
truck. There 'vas nothing in the record to indicate that
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plaintiff had any opportunity to take that alternative
nor is there anything- in the record to indicate that there
'Yas sufficient roon1 bet,veen the Pace automobile and
the defendants' truck for plaintiff to pass through unscathed. We shudder at the contemplation of the result 'vhich 'Yould hav-e necessarily ensued if plaintiff
had attempted to sandwich himself bet,veen the two
vehicles in order to avoid the accident, assuming that
he had the opportunity to do so; and counsel have the
effontery to urge this amazing proposition despite the
court's Instruction No. 14 "\Vhich permitted the jury to
find from the evidence that plaintiff was responsible for
the en1ergency created by plaintiff's unlawful attempt
to pass another vehicle in a dust storm. (R. 71)
In their assignment of error No. 14 the defendants
con1plained of the court's failure to give their requested
instruction to the effect that the jury might find that
the plaintiff 'vas negligent in driving at all in the dust
storm. Defendants' position here approaches the testiInony of \;an Patten in achieving the ultimate of inconsistency-. At a time when defendant claimed. to be able
to see 200 yards ahead and at a time that Van Patten
vvas on the wrong side of the road flamboyantly passing
another vehicle defendants now urge that plaintiff was
required to take his vehicle into the field. They make
this assertion in spite of the uncontradicted testimony of
l\iitchell, corroborated by the other passengers in the
~fitchell car, that ~Iitchell was actually in th.e process
of pulling .his car off the road when the impact occurred.
The defendants also make this assertion at the same
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ti1ne acknowledging that the court in its instruction No.
10 told the jury that if conditions of visibility were such
that plaintiff or defendant Van Patten could not ascertain or determine his' position on the highway or
could not see approaching traffic, then it became the
duty of each to pull off onto the shoulder on his right
hand side of the highway.
In their assignment of error No. 10 the defendants
co1nplain of the language in the last line of the instruction. The strained interpretation placed upon the instruction by the defendants is unwarranted. Counsel directs the eourt's attention to the last paragraph of ·the
instruction, we direct the ·court's attention to the instruction in its entirety, which is as follows:
''You are instructed that while plaintiff
claims that the defendant, Marvin C. Van Patten,
was under a duty to drive and operate the truck
he was driving at a reasonable speed, having due
regard for the conditions then and there existing,
it was also the duty of the plaintiff to likewise
drive a.t a reasonable and prudent speed, having
due regard to such conditions.
''You are further instructed that if conditions
of visibility -vvere such that plaintiff or defendant
Van Patten could not ascertain or determine his
position on the highway, or such that they could
not see approaching traffic, then it became the
duty of each to pull off onto the shoulder on his
right hand side of the highway, if necessary, to
avoid a collision in the exercise of reasonable and
ordinary care.
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'~Therefore,

if you find from the evidence
that plaintiff or defendant \Tan p·atten was unable
to see his true position on the highway and continued to drive at a speed which was not reasonable and prudent under the conditions then and
there existing, then the one violating this duty
was negligent.''
Obviously, if the high,vay conditions required one
ear to stop, it required them both and the jury could not
possibly have been misled hy the last line as counsel
would have us believe.

Point 5. The court did not err itn denying
defendants' motion fo•r .a new t:rrol.
After the verdict was returned, counsel for the defendants contacted the jurors and obtained affidavits
from seven of them including the affidavit of the foreman (R. 122) which they set forth in their brief at page
63. Each of the seven jurors that furnished affidavits at
the instance of the defendants furnished another affidavit to a contrary effect. Representative of the ·counterdavits is the one obtained from the foreman Stirling E.
Tanner, \vhich we quote as follows:
1

''Stirling E. Tanner, being first duly sworn
on oath, deposes and says : That he is one of the
jurors and foreman on the trial of the above entitled case, wherein a verdict "\vas returned on Monday, April 26, 1958; that the amount of the verdict
was determined in the following manner:
''We first agreed to return a verdict for the
plaintiff. We then allowed the sp.ecial damages
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of $1638.50 on the first cause of action and
$1264.00 on the second cause of action. We then
added $16,591.72 from the annuity table, plus
$900.00 for wages to plaintiff's brother during
1947. We differed as to the amount to be paid for
pain and suffering, and after discussion we had
difficulty in coming to an agreement. It was proposed that we sub!ffiit an amount on a slip of paper
for the purpos.e of determining how widely we
were apart, and for the purpose of totaling the
various sums together to arrive a:t an average. If
the average vvas a fair one, and if everyone accepted that average, then that was to constitute
the amount to be allowed for 'pain and suffering.
The figures submitted on the slips of paper were
handed to 1ne and I had the figures divided by
eight, which gave
result of $1190-(a.pproxiInately $1200). The jurors discus-sed this figure
and decided that it 'vas a fair one, and it was
accepted a.s a fair and proper award for pain and
suffering, and incorporated into the verdict.
There was no understanding or agreement among
the jurors before the ballot was submitted and the
average taken that they would be bound by the
result, and after the averake was taken there was
discussion among the jurors as to whether or not
such average was reasonable,-to which all of the
jurors agreed.

a

·'The former affidavit which I signed in this
matter was prepared by 1Ir. Edwin B. Cannon
in his own "\Vords, and since making said affidavit
my attention has been called thereto, and especially to the following language; "We also agreed
to adopt the average as our verdict, after including the amounts hereinabove mentioned. We each
submitted a figure by secret ballot and they were
then handed to me and I added the figures and
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diYided by eight, \\"hich gave a result of $1200,
w··hich governed our final verdict without further
deliberation. Adding all of the figures was
cheeked by son1e of the jurors, but there was no
further deliberation after we ·computed 'tlhe ·average of $1200 as to pain and suffering. On my slip
I put nothing for pain and suffering but consented
to the result because of our p·revious agreement.''
·~At the tune I 1nade said affidavit I did not
observe the language quoted above, or notice the
effect of it, and especially the words 'which figure
governed our final verdict without furthe-r deliberation,' and 'there was no further deliberation
after "\Ye computed the average,' and 'consented
to the result because of our previous agreement.''
for it is not true that before said average was
con1puted there was any agreement or understanding that the jury, or any member of the
jury, would be bound by said average as and for
the verdict of the jury; but I, as w·ell as every
other n1ember of the jury, was at liberty to accept
or reject the average, and, after the averake was
taken, there was a further deliberation in the
sense that the jurors discussed the average figure,
determined it to be fair, and expressed a willingness to accept it as each man's estimate, and I
concurred in the verdict because I deemed the
amount to be fair." (R.. 137-138)
It 'vill appear from the above affidavit of the foreman that nothing irregular occurred in the jury room
\Vhich could provide defendants with a basis for a new
trial. The only juror who did not provide both parties
with an affidavit furnished one at the instance of the
plaintiff, -the affidavit being in his own language and as
follows:
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''B. F. Lofgren, being first duly sworn on
oath, deposes and says: That he is one of the
jurors on the trial of the above entitled cause,
wherein a verdict was returned Monday, April
26, 1948.

''My recollection is that the amount of the
verdict in the above entitled case was arrived
at in the following manner:
''We first agreed to return a verdict for the
plaintiff. Special damages were then discussed
and we agreed to allow $1638.50. On the second
cause of action we allowed $1264.00. 'The question
of loss of earning power was discussed, and it
was agreed to allow an amount which would provide approximately $100.00 per month for the
plaintiff's expected life,-the exact amount was
taken from the annuity table to be $16,591.72. The
amount of $900.00 was allowed for wages paid
plaintiff's brother, due to plaintiff's past loss
of earning power.
''On the question of damage for pain and
suffering there was little basis for arriving at an
amount. It was agreed that each juror should
submit his estimate to the foreman to find how
widely these separate estimates varied. The foreman found the average of the separate estimates
to be approximately $1200.00, and the separate
estimates varied from zero to about $2,000.00.
The foreman announced the average and the jurors discussed whether that amount could be considered a fair allowance. The amount of $1200.00
was adopted and the total verdict was then added
and adopted by the jurors." (R. 239-140)
In view of the explanations furnished by the seven
in their second affidavits and in view of the affidavit of
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the eighth juror, ~Ir. Lofgren, there can be no question
but \Yhat the defendants have altogether failed to discharge their burden of proving the irreg·ular calculation
of the verdict in this case. Defendants are in no position
to complain that the jurors fron1 'vho1n they obtained
the affidavits altered and explained their position in a
subsequent affidavit. If counsel was diss'atisfied with the
state of the record, we would have w,elcomed an examination of the jurors before the court upon the hearing
of the motion for new trial. The only juror who did not
furnish t\YO affidavits in this ease established the regularity of the proceeding in the jury room. It is significant that each of the seven jurorR asserted in his second affidavit that the first affidavit was not prepared
by the affiant and was not given in his own words.
Son1e of the affiants directly asserted that the language
of the affidavit ''Tas the language of Mr. Cannon. (R.
135-149)

It follows that the court properly overruled the defendants' motion for new trial.
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CONCLUSION
The record in the case a.t bar discloses that the defendants were given a full and fair trial and that the
verdict of the jury was fully justified by the evidence
and \vas in all respects fair and just. The defendants
have not shown any error on the part of the trial court
rnaterial and prejudicial to their substantial rights. Indeed, the trial court in its instructions to the jury gave
the defendants more consideration than the evidence warranted. We, therefore, earnestly submit that the judgrnen t of the court below should be affirmed.
1

Respectfully submitted,

CLYDE, MECHAM & WHITE
Att;orneys for
Respondent.

P~ain~iff

and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

